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SUMMARY
We consider the optimal pricing problem in a service facility in order to maximize its
long-run average profit per unit time. We model the facility as a queueing process that may
have finite or infinite capacity. Customers are admitted into the system if it is not full and
if they are willing to pay the price posted by the service provider.
Moreover, the congestion level in the facility incurs penalties that greatly influence profit.
We model congestion penalties in three different manners: holding costs, balking customers
and impatient customers. First, we assume that congestion-dependent holding costs are
incurred per unit of time. Second, we consider that each customer might be deterred by
the system congestion level and might balk upon arrival. Third, customers are impatient
and can leave the system with a full refund before being serviced.
We are interested in both static and dynamic pricing for all three types of congestion
penalties. In the static case, we demonstrate that there is a unique optimal price that
maximizes the long-run average profit per unit time. We also investigate how optimal
prices vary as system parameters change. In the dynamic case, we show the existence of
an optimal stationary policy in a continuous and unbounded action space that maximizes
the long-run average profit per unit time. We provide explicit expressions for this policy
under certain conditions. We also analyze the structure of this policy and investigate its




Determining the optimal price to be charged for a service facility is a critical decision for a
manager. There is a trade-off between high prices and high demand that greatly influences
revenue. Not all customers react the same way to advertised prices and the maximum
amount that each customer is willing to pay is often random.
Moreover, the congestion level in the system affects the operating efficiency of the facility
and incur penalties that reduce profit. In a congested service facility with scarce resources,
entering customers might wait for service and might even be turned down by the service
provider who can not accommodate them. There is a loss of service quality and customer
goodwill associated with long waiting times. In addition, potential customers are often
deterred by high congestion levels when this information is available to them through quoted
lead times. Congestion plays a key role and affects the operating performance as well
customers’ behavior. A service provider who ignores congestion not only overestimates
profit but also fails to realize that pricing can be used to control congestion costs. Setting
high prices can be helpful to reduce congestion by dissuading customers from entering an
overcrowded facility.
Although it has applications in other service industries, the work in this dissertation
was originally motivated by the pricing problem of outsourced computer services. These
services offer processing power, server time or bandwidth resources and are provided to
businesses that do not have sufficient in-house capabilities. These solutions present an
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inexpensive and flexible way to handle spikes in computing needs for businesses with
limited resources. Sam Palmisano, IBM’s CEO, forsees a near future in which “busi-
nesses [would] buy computing power on demand, similar to the way electricity is pur-
chased” (see http://news.com.com/IBM+talks+up+computing+on+demand/2100-1001 3-
963807.html). As businesses computing needs grow larger, these products give smaller
companies access to supercomputing power that only very large corporations could af-
ford (see http://www-03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/7949.wss). The most promi-
nent providers of such services include IBM, Hewlett-Packard, Cisco Systems, AT&T and
Schlumberger. In the same fashion as utilities, the prices of these services should increase
with congestion and usage. Our objective is to develop a better understanding of how
congestion affects the optimal pricing decisions of the provider of such services.
We model the service facility as a queueing system with finite or infinite capacity (size).
The queueing framework enables us to capture the variability of service times, customers’
arrival times and customers’ price sensitivity, as well as analytically tractable congestion
penalties. We suppose that customers have independent identically distributed valuations
of service and enter the system when it is not full and when their valuation is greater
than the current advertised price. We will refer to the distribution of service valuation as
willingness-to-pay distribution and we assume that the associated process is independent of
arrival and service times and that prices are paid upon arrival.
We are interested in both static and dynamic pricing. The service provider is said to use
static pricing, when prices are set at time zero and cannot be changed during the lifetime of
the system. The service provider is said to use dynamic pricing, when prices can be adjusted
in time. Note that this usually translates into having congestion-dependent prices; that is,
prices that depend on the current congestion level of the system. When dynamic pricing
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is in use, we refine our model by segmenting customers into a finite number of classes.
Each class forms a homogeneous group where customers have the same willingness-to-pay
distribution. However, the willingness-to-pay distribution might be different from one class
to another. The service provider may advertise different prices to each customer class. This
ability to have class-specific congestion-dependent prices is referred to as dynamic precision
pricing . Moreover, when congestion penalties are incurred, dynamic pricing allows price
adjustments to the current congestion level. Therefore, pricing can be dynamically adapted
to the cost of congestion in each state.
The objective our work is to determine the optimal static and dynamic pricing policies
that maximize the long-run average profit per unit time for a service facility subject to
congestion penalties. Then, we seek to analyze structural properties of our results as well as
their sensitivity to system parameters. This includes understanding the congestion control
features of optimal prices and studying how optimal prices change as system parameters
vary.
We develop our model by capturing congestion penalties in three different ways: holding
costs, balking customers and impatient customers. In the holding cost model, we assume
that state-dependent holding costs are incurred per unit of time. This is the case when
each customer incurs a fixed cost per unit time spent in the system. One can think of
this congestion penalty as a loss of customer goodwill that is proportional to the customer
sojourn time. The longer the customer waits, the less likely the customer is to return.
Although the system congestion is experienced by customers, the service provider indirectly
bears its cost as she experiences its effects as a future loss of revenue.
In the model with balking customers, customers directly react to the current congestion
level. In this case, we consider that each customer has a random congestion valuation
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to make her decision whether to enter the system or not. Hence, only customers who
are willing to pay the current price and who tolerate the current congestion level enter the
system, otherwise they balk and do not pay. Note that this random congestion valuation can
be considered as willingness-to-wait with a willingness-to-wait distribution. Such a behavior
is experienced in service facilities where potential customers are quoted a service lead time
and make their decision to purchase products based both on price and quoted waiting time.
Internet commerce companies encounter this issue in periods of heavy demand, as they
provide customers with expected shipping and delivery times.
In the model with impatient customers, customers who are willing to pay the current
advertised price enter the system if it is not full and pay upon arrival. However, each cus-
tomer waiting for service is impatient and reneges if he is not serviced prior to his maximum
waiting time. We assume that customers’ maximum waiting times are independent, identi-
cally distributed exponential random variables and that reneging customers are given a full
refund. Note that in stable systems, this is equivalent to a model where customers pay upon
service completion. This type of customer behavior is experienced in call centers, where
customers have to wait for an operator to purchase a product. Impatient customers might
renege and hang up and only customers who complete the phone transaction contribute to
the bottom line.
The outline of this dissertation is as follows. In Chapter 2, we review the literature
on the issue of pricing in queueing systems related to our work. Then, we decompose our
analysis into two parts: static pricing in Chapter 3 and dynamic precision pricing in Chapter
4. In each of these two chapters, we describe our results for each congestion model: holding
costs, balking customers and impatient customers. Chapter 5 contains the conclusion to
our work as well directions for future research. In Appendices A and B, we show technical
4




The use of nontraditional pricing strategies in order to maximize profit in service facilities
has generated much interest in the recent years. Although our work directly considers
pricing in order to maximize profit, it is inspired by a series of papers on the more general
topic of congestion control in queueing systems. We can group them in two categories,
depending on whether the control is static or dynamic.
The paper by Naor [16] is the first one that combines the issues of pricing and congestion
control in queues. Naor’s work and many papers extending it (such as Knudsen [9] and
Yechiali [21]) analyze systems where customers make a decision to enter a service facility
based on its current queue length. Entering customers obtain a fixed reward and are charged
a holding cost function of their time spent in the system. In order to maximize their utility,
they decide to join or balk (join-balk rule). The service provider then imposes an entrance
fee to induce an optimal customer admission rate. Larsen [10] and Hassin [6] evaluate
the effect of releasing the expected queue length to potential customers as opposed to the
current queue length.
Mendelson and Whang [15] consider customers who make their decision to enter the
system based both on price and delay. Mendelson and Whang [15] also include different
customer classes that have different demand functions and delay costs. Prices are then
used by the decision maker as an incentive to induce optimal customer arrival rates and
execution priorities.
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Ittig [7] develops a model in which congestion is treated as a form of price. His objective
is not optimal pricing but he determines the optimal number of servers for the service facility.
He introduces a general demand function relating average waiting time and demand rate as
well as a cost of service capacity. He sets up a nonlinear constrained optimization problem
where the queueing link between demand rate and average waiting time is a constraint.
Ittig [8] is also interested in estimating the optimal number of servers through transaction
data when the relationship between demand and congestion is not explicitly known.
Ziya [22, 24] focuses on optimal static pricing for systems without holding costs in
M/G/1/∞ and M/M/1/N queueing systems. Instead of using a congestion-based join-
balk rule, he links the customers’ arrival rate to the posted price through a random service
valuation for each customer. He uses a willingness-to-pay distribution to capture the pro-
portion of customers willing to pay the posted price and shows the existence of a unique
optimal price that maximizes the long-run average profit. Ziya [22, 24] also exhibits how
the optimal price changes as system parameters vary and addresses the issue of precision
static pricing, where the service provider can advertise static class-specific prices in systems
without holding costs.
In all the papers mentioned above, the system controls are static: that is, the controls
are set by the decision maker once and remain unchanged throughout the life of the system.
In the second group of papers, controls are allowed to depend on the state of the system
(dynamic control). Stidham [19] develops a dynamic admission control model to optimize
an infinite-horizon discounted reward with convex holding costs in single server queues.
Stidham’s decision variable is defined as whether to accept or reject an incoming job. Each
accepted job yields a fixed deterministic reward. He shows the existence of a monotonic
optimal stationary policy. He also extends his results to simple networks of queues.
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On the other hand, George and Harrison [4] allow the service provider to dynamically
control the service rate instead of the arrival rate. There is a penalty that depends on the
chosen service rate and the objective is to minimize the long-run average cost in systems
with holding costs.
Combining the problems of setting admission rates and service rates, Ata and Shneor-
son [2] consider a dynamic control model where the service provider sets state-dependent
admission rates and service rates in an M/M/1 queue with holding costs. There is a reward
associated with the chosen admission rates and a cost corresponding to the chosen service
rates. After explicitly solving this problem, they analyze a decentralized model, where only
service rates and prices are decision variables. The service provider must set them so that
the optimal arrival rates are induced by customers maximizing their own utility.
Low [12], [13] is interested in dynamic pricing in M/M/s queues with finite or infinite
capacity but with a finite action space. Low does not use a willingness-to-pay distribution
but each price in the action space corresponds to a given positive arrival rate. Low also
considers state-dependent holding costs incurred as a lump sum as a customer arrives. He
makes the extra assumption that holding costs are bounded and that the facility has multiple
identical servers. He shows that optimal prices are nondecreasing as the system becomes
congested and develops an algorithm to solve the Markov decision process formulation of
the problem. Aktaran and Ayhan [1], as well as Çil, Karaesmen and Örmeci [3], further
investigate the sensitivity of the optimal prices to system parameters. Paschalidis and
Tsitsiklis [17] focus on models with multiple classes of customers that have different resource
requirements without holding costs.
Differing from earlier work, we consider systems with holding costs, systems with balking
customers and systems with impatient customers as alternative ways to capture congestion
8
penalties. We extend Ziya’s work on static pricing by introducing these three types of
congestion penalties and by considering capacity as a decision variable. We also extend
Low’s work on dynamic pricing with holding costs by introducing a general parameter
structure and by considering a continuous unbounded action space for multiple customer
classes in finite or infinite capacity systems. Unlike models with holding costs, the issue
of pricing in queues with balking or impatient customers with refund has received little






In this chapter, the service provider can only advertise one price at all times for all cus-
tomers. Therefore, an optimal policy is characterized by a single advertised price. After
describing the model, we determine the optimal prices for the service facility subject to each
of the three congestion penalties. First, we focus on system with holding costs. Then, we
analyze systems with balking customers, and finally, we consider systems with impatient
customers.
We model the service facility as a single server system, where N ≤ ∞ is the maximum
number of customers allowed in the system at any time. Arriving customers enter if the
system is not full and if they are willing to pay the price charged by the service provider.
Let y denote the mark-up charged for service. Note that the price to be charged is
the sum of the mark-up and the variable cost of service. Without loss of generality, we
assume that the variable cost of service is zero, so the mark-up is equal to the price. Let
N(t) be the number of arrivals in the time interval (0, t]. We assume that {N(t) : t ≥ 0}
is a Poisson process with rate Λ . We call Λ the maximum arrival rate. For y ≥ 0, let
F (y) be the proportion of customers willing to pay a price of at most y. We call F (·), the
willingness-to-pay distribution. We assume that the cumulative distribution function F (·) is
absolutely continuous with density f(·), support (α, β) and finite mean. Let r(·) denote the
hazard rate function of F (·); that is, r(y) = f(y)1−F (y) for α < y < β and we define r(y) = 0 for
y ≤ α and r(y) = ∞ for y ≥ β. In what follows, we assume that F has IGHR (Increasing
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Generalized Hazard Rate); that is, yr(y) is strictly increasing for all y in [α, β).
Assumption IGHR is equivalent to the demand function having decreasing price elas-
ticity (see Proposition 2.1 in Ziya [23]). Many common distribution functions (such as
exponential and uniform distributions) have this property that simply states that the de-
mand becomes more elastic as prices decrease.
Let N(y, t) be the number of customers who are willing to pay a price of at most y and
arrive during (0, t]. Let λ(y) denote the arrival rate of customers who are willing to pay a




Service times are independent, identically distributed random variables with distribution
G(·), mean 1
µ
and squared coefficient of variation c2s. The service process, the arrival process
and the process associated with the amounts successive customers are willing to pay are
assumed to be independent.
When the price is y, the number of customers in the system forms a queueing process
with Poisson arrival process {N(y, t) : t ≥ 0} and independent, identically distributed
service times with c.d.f G(·). When an arriving customer is willing to pay the posted price,
the customer enters the system if the system is not full; otherwise, the customer is lost.
Let ρ(y) = Λ
µ
(1 − F (y)) denote the traffic intensity when the price is y. Let ŷ be the
maximum price under which we have a traffic intensity of 1; that is, ŷ = sup{y : ρ(y) =
1} when Λ
µ
≥ 1. Note that when Λ
µ
< 1, ŷ = −∞. We define the state of the system X(t) as
the number of customers in the system at time t. When they exist, {πn(ρ, N)} and L(ρ, N)
denote the stationary distribution and the expected number of customers in the system for
traffic intensity ρ and capacity N .
Let R(y, N) be the long-run average profit per unit time for a posted price y and capacity
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N . The optimal static pricing problem can be formulated as:
max
y
R(y, N), subject to y ≥ 0.
When it exists and is unique, we let y∗N denote the optimal price to be charged to maximize
R(y, N) and R∗N = R(y
∗
N , N) denote the optimal objective value.
In the following, we consider the optimal pricing problem for the service facility to each
of the three congestion penalties: first, we focus on system with holding costs. Then, we
analyze systems with balking customers and finally, we consider systems with impatient
customers.
3.2 Systems with Holding Costs
In this section, we capture congestion penalties through holding costs. More specifically, we
assume that each entering customer pays the posted price at the time of arrival and incurs
a cost of h per unit time while in the system as in Figure 1. To ensure that a positive










-$sh per unit time
Figure 1: System with Holding Costs
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3.2.1 Optimal Pricing for M/G/1/∞ Queues
In the following, we derive expressions for R(y,∞) and y∗∞ when no further assumptions are
made on the service time distribution. Only customers who are willing to pay the posted
price y enter the system and they pay y immediately. Since they incur an additional cost
of h per unit time that they spend in the system,
R(y,∞) = lim
t→∞




















Therefore, we can write the long-run average reward per unit time as
R(y,∞) = yλ(y) − hL(ρ(y),∞).
Clearly, if ρ(y) ≥ 1 and h > 0, then L(ρ(y),∞) = ∞ and R(y,∞) = −∞. From the
Pollaczek-Khinchin formula [5], if ρ(y) < 1,
L(ρ(y),∞) =
ρ(y)(2 − ρ(y)(1 − c2s))
2(1 − ρ(y))
.
Therefore, if ρ(y) < 1,
R(y,∞) = yλ(y) − h
ρ(y)(2 − ρ(y)(1 − c2s))
2(1 − ρ(y))
.
Note that the long-run average reward function consists of two terms : the first de-
scribing the revenue through the arrival rate regardless of the service times, whereas the
second accounts for the additional holding cost through the steady-state average number of
customers in the system.
In the following result, we show the existence and the uniqueness of an optimal price.
13









































if ρ < 1, h > 0,
∞ if ρ ≥ 1, h > 0,
0 if h = 0.
Proof First, assume h > 0 and let α̂ = max(α, ŷ). Note that for all y less than or equal to
ŷ, the reward function is equal to −∞. Therefore, an optimal price, if it exists, has to be
greater than ŷ. Since F (·) is absolutely continuous, for all y in [α̂, β), R(y,∞) is continuous










(2 − ρ(y)(1 − c2s))
2(1 − ρ(y))
→ µβ − h > 0 as y tends to β .
Therefore, there exists y in [α̂, β) such that R(y,∞) > 0. Moreover, for all y in [α̂, β),
R(y,∞) < ∞ and R(y,∞) → 0 as y → β. So, there exists an optimal price in [α̂, β).
If R(y,∞) is differentiable with respect to y ∈ [α̂, β), then ∂R(y,∞)
∂y
> 0(< 0) if and
only if r(y)(y − ϕ(y)) < 1(> 1). Since there exists y in [α̂, β) such that R(y,∞) > 0 and
R(y,∞) → 0 as y → β, there exists y in [α̂, β) such that r(y)(y − h
µ







≤ 0, for all y in [α̂, β), so ϕ(ρ(y)) ≥ ϕ(0) = 1. Under Assumption
IGHR, r(y)(y− h
µ
ϕ(ρ(y))) is strictly increasing in the interval [inf{y : r(y)(y− h
µ
ϕ(ρ(y))) ≥
1}, β), so R(y,∞) is decreasing in the interval (inf{y : r(y)(y − h
µ
ϕ(ρ(y))) ≥ 1}, β). In the
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same fashion, R(y,∞) is increasing in the interval (α̂, inf{y : r(y)(y − h
µ
ϕ(ρ(y))) ≥ 1}).
Eventually, we can conclude that y∗∞ = inf{y : r(y)(y −
h
µ
ϕ(ρ(y))) ≥ 1}. 2
When h = 0, the result reduces to y∗∞ = inf{y : yr(y) ≥ 1}, which agrees with the
characterization of the optimal price in Proposition 3.3.1 of Ziya [22].
We can use Theorem 3.2.1 to derive the following result for M/M/1/∞ queueing systems.
Corollary 3.2.1 If the service times are exponentially distributed and h > 0, then there






































if ρ < 1, h > 0,
∞ if ρ ≥ 1, h > 0,
0 if h = 0.
Depending on the willingness-to-pay distribution, it might be difficult to compute y∗∞.
The next result provides bounds (which are obtained by replacing ϕ(ρ(y)) by ϕ(Λ
µ
) in the
expression of y∗∞) on the optimal price. These bounds will also be used in the next section
in order to compare the properties of systems with and without holding costs.
Proposition 3.2.1 The unique optimal price y∗∞ satisfies
h
µ

















Proof First, suppose that y∗∞ <
h
µ
. If h = 0, then there is clearly a contradiction. Assume









which is a contradiction since we proved in Theorem 3.2.1 that there exists y in [α̂, β) such
that R(y,∞) > 0. Therefore, h
µ
≤ y∗∞.
Now suppose Λ < µ. From Theorem 3.2.1, y∗∞ = inf{y : r(y)(y −
h
µ













) ≥ ϕ(ρ(y)) for y ≥ 0. Therefore, for all y




)) ≥ 1, we have r(y)(y − h
µ
ϕ(ρ(y))). This completes the
proof. 2
We now compare the optimal price and the optimal reward in two M/G/1/∞ systems
(indexed by 1 and 2). These two systems differ by marginal holding cost, maximum arrival
rates, service rates and squared coefficients of variation. Moreover, we also compare systems
where the willingness-to-pay distributions are ordered in the stochastic ordering and hazard
rate ordering. Recall that distribution F1 is greater than or equal to distribution F2 in
the stochastic ordering (F1 ≥ST F2) if and only if F1(y) ≤ F2(y),∀y ≥ 0. Furthermore,
distribution F1 is greater than or equal to distribution F2 in the hazard rate ordering
(F1 ≥HR F2) if and only if r1(y) ≤ r2(y),∀y ≥ 0. Our objective is to compare the optimal
prices y∗∞,1 and y
∗
∞,2 for these two systems.





We show in the next proposition that this result still holds when holding costs are incurred.
However, stochastic ordering of the willingness-to-pay distributions do not necessarily guar-
antee ordered optimal prices (see Section 3.4 in Ziya [22] for a counterexample). In the
remainder of this section, parameters relative to system i = 1, 2 are indicated by subscript
i.
Proposition 3.2.2 Consider two systems 1 and 2 that satisfy all of the following :
1. Λ1 ≥ Λ2,
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2. F1 ≥HR F2,
3. h1 ≥ h2,
4. c2s,1 ≥ c
2
s,2,
5. µ1 ≤ µ2.
Then, y∗∞,1 ≥ y
∗
∞,2.
Proof From Theorem 3.2.1, we have y∗∞,i = inf{y : ri(y)(y −
hi
µi
ϕi(ρi(y))) ≥ 1} for system
i = 1, 2. Since hazard rate ordering implies stochastic ordering, F1 ≥ST F2. In conjunction
with conditions 1 and 5, this implies that ρ1(·) ≥ ρ2(·). Moreover, we showed in the proof
of Theorem 3.2.1 that ϕ(·) is nondecreasing. Therefore, we have ϕ1(ρ1(·)) ≥ ϕ2(ρ2(·)) from
condition 4. Suppose that y is such that r1(y)(y −
h1
µ1
ϕ1(ρ1(y))) ≥ 1. Then, r2(y)(y −
h2
µ2





As shown in the proof of Proposition 3.2.2, it is intuitive that systems with higher
maximum arrival rate, smaller service rates, higher service variance and higher marginal
holding cost yield higher long-run average holding cost. Therefore, it is not surprising that
the optimal price should be higher when higher holding costs are incurred.




, then y∗1 ≥ y
∗
2.
However, this result of Ziya does not extend to facilities with holding costs. Consider two






= 0.5. For both systems, assume that the willingness-to-pay distribution is exponential
with rate 1. According to Proposition 3.2.1 the optimal solution for system i = 1, 2 satisfies:
h
µi





So, y∗∞,1 ≤ 4h + 1 and 10h ≤ y
∗










In the next result, we analyze how the optimal reward varies as parameters change.
Proposition 3.2.3 Consider two systems 1 and 2 that satisfy all of the following :
1. Λ1 ≥ Λ2,
2. F1 ≥ST F2,
3. h1 ≤ h2,
4. c2s,1 ≤ c
2
s,2,
5. µ1 ≥ µ2.
Then, R∗∞,1 ≥ R
∗
∞,2.
Proof To prove this result, we split our proof into two parts. First, we show that the result
holds when conditions 1 and 2 are changed to equalities. Second, we show that it holds
when conditions 3,4 and 5 are changed to equalities. By composition, the result holds under
all the conditions as well.
Suppose that conditions 3,4 and 5 hold and Λ1 = Λ2 and F1(·) = F2(·). Recall that for
all y ≥ 0,
Ri(y,∞) = yλi(y) − hiLi(ρi(y),∞).






Now suppose that 1 and 2 hold, whereas 3,4 and 5 are equalities. Since F1(·) is absolutely
continuous and λ1(·) ≥ λ2(·), there exists δ > 0 such that λ1(y
∗




system 1 with price y∗2 + δ has the same arrival and service rates as system 2 with price y
∗
2.
Therefore, system 1 with price y∗2 + δ performs better than system 2 with optimal price.
Hence, R∗∞,1 ≥ R
∗
∞,2 and the proof is complete. 2
3.2.2 Optimal Pricing for M/M/1/N Queues
In this section, we study optimal pricing for capacitated queues. We focus on M/M/1/N
queueing systems for which we can easily quantify the long-run average queue length and
the long-run average reward function. We prove the existence of a unique optimal price
under the IGHR assumption and derive ordering properties as system parameters change.
Only customers who are willing to pay the posted price y and find fewer than N cus-
tomers in the system are allowed to enter. Therefore,
R(y, N) = lim
t→∞




where Nin(y, t) denotes the number of customers allowed in the system up to time t. From
Little’s result,
R(y, N) = yλ(y)(1 − πN (ρ(y), N)) − hL(ρ(y), N).
Recall from Gross and Harris [5] that
L(ρ(y), N) =
ρ(y)(1 − (N + 1)ρ(y)N + Nρ(y)N+1)
















if ρ 6= 1,
1
N+1 if ρ = 1.
We can also express the long-run average reward per unit time as
R(y, N) = yµ(1 − π0(ρ(y), N)) − hρ(y)
(1 − (N + 1)ρ(y)N + Nρ(y)N+1)
(1 − ρ(y))(1 − ρ(y)N+1)
.
We demonstrate the existence and the uniqueness of an optimal price in Theorem 3.2.2.
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Theorem 3.2.2 There exists a unique optimal price given by :
y∗N = inf
{






























if ρ 6= 1,
1
6N
2 + 12N +
1
















if ρ 6= 1,
1
2 if ρ = 1.
Proof First, we will prove that there exists an optimal solution. Note that for all y in
[α, β), L(ρ(y), N) ≤ L(ρ(y),∞) = ρ(y)1−ρ(y) . When y is in the neighborhood of β, ρ(y) < 1
and L(ρ(y),∞) < ∞. So, for y in the neighborhood of β,






(µy(1 − πN (ρ(y), N))(1 − ρ(y)) − h).
Under the assumption that h
µ
< β,
µy(1 − πN (ρ(y), N))(1 − ρ(y)) − h → µβ − h > 0, as y → β.
Therefore, there exists y in [α, β) such that R(y, N) > 0. Note that R(·, N) is continuous
and also bounded on [α, β) since R(y, N) → 0 as y → β. Hence, there exists an optimal
price in [α, β).
If R(y, N) is differentiable with respect to y in the interval [α, β), then ∂R(y,N)
∂y
> 0(<
0) if and only if r(y)γhN (ρ(y))(y −
h
µ
ϕN (ρ(y))) < 1(> 1). Since there exists y in [α, β)











is increasing in [inf{y : r(y)γhN (ρ(y))(y −
h
µ
ϕN (ρ(y))) ≥ 1}, β).
According to Lemma A.1 in Ziya [24], γhN (ρ(y)) is nondecreasing for y > 0. From Lemma










ϕN (ρ(y))) ≥ 1}, β).
Hence, R(y, N) is decreasing in (inf{y : r(y)γhN (ρ(y))(y−
h
µ
ϕN (ρ(y))) ≥ 1}, β). In the same
fashion, R(y, N) is increasing in (α, inf{y : r(y)γhN (ρ(y))(y −
h
µ
ϕN (ρ(y))) ≥ 1}). Therefore,
y∗N = inf
{











Since the optimal price is not always easy to compute, the next result provides some
bounds on y∗N .
Proposition 3.2.4 The unique optimal price y∗N satisfies
h
µ




















































































Proof First, suppose that y∗N <
h
µ







λ(y∗N ) < 0. We proved in Theorem 3.2.2 that there exists y in [α, β) such that R(y, N) > 0.





Recall from Theorem 3.2.2 that
y∗N = inf
{










Moreover, we proved in Theorem A.0.1 that ϕN (ρ(y)) is nonincreasing with respect to y.
Thus,
ϕN (ρ(y)) ≤ ϕN (
Λ
µ
) = ΦN .






) ≤ γhN (ρ(y)).
Let y be in [α, β) such that r(y)ΓhN (y −
h
µ





















ΦN ) ≥ 1}. 2
As in the M/G/1/∞ case, we now compare the optimal prices of two systems with
different parameters. In the remainder of this section, parameters relative to system i = 1, 2
are indexed by i.
First, we study how the optimal price y∗N changes as capacity N increases. From Propo-
sition 4.2 in Ziya [24], we know that when h = 0, the optimal price is increasing (decreasing)
with respect to the capacity when Λ
µ
> (<)ρc, where ρc is called the critical traffic intensity
(ρc = (1 − F (inf{y : yr(y) ≥ 2}))−1). However, when h > 0, this is not always the case.
Let F (y) = 1− e−βy, with β = 0.1 and Λ = 8, µ = 2 and h = 1. In this case, when capacity




7 are 16.4204, 16.4064, 16.4245, respectively.
Hence, the optimal price is not monotone in capacity. However, the next result shows that
optimal prices are ordered with respect to other system parameters.
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Proposition 3.2.5 Consider two systems 1 and 2 that satisfy all of the following :
1. F1 ≥HR F2 ,
2. Λ1 ≥ Λ2,
3. µ1 ≤ µ2,
4. h1 ≥ h2.
Then, y∗N,1 ≥ y
∗
N,2.






Moreover, as shown in Theorem 3.2.2, ϕN (·) is nondecreasing and γ
h
N (·) is nonincreasing.
Therefore, ϕN (ρ1(y)) ≥ ϕN (ρ2(y)) and γ
h
N (ρ2(y)) ≥ γ
h
N (ρ1(y)) for all y in [α, β).





ϕN (ρ1(y))) ≥ 1. Using the properties




















Hence, y∗N,2 ≤ y
∗
N,1. 2
Similar to the infinite capacity case, Proposition 3.5.1 in Ziya [22] shows that in systems




implies that y∗N,1 ≥ y
∗
N,2. This result cannot be extended to
systems with holding costs. To see this, consider two M/M/1/2 systems, 1 and 2, where
µ1 = 1, µ2 = .1, Λ1 = 0.5, Λ2 = 0.0001. So,
Λ2
µ2
= 0.001 ≤ Λ1
µ1
= 0.5. For both systems,
assume that the willingness-to-pay distribution is exponential with rate 1. Therefore, we











Note that ΦN,1 = 1.625 and (Γ
h
N,1)
−1 = 1.3125 . Therefore, y∗N,1 ≤ 1.3125 + 1.625h and




∞,2. We can claim that the arrival rate, service rate and
hazard rate orderings that hold when h = 0 in the M/M/1/N case still hold when h > 0.
However, as in the infinite capacity case, the traffic intensity ordering without holding costs
cannot be extended when h > 0.
The following result shows that the optimal rewards are also ordered as the system
parameters change.
Proposition 3.2.6 Consider two systems 1 and 2 that satisfy all of the following :
1. Λ1 ≥ Λ2,
2. F1 ≥ST F2,
3. h1 ≤ h2,
4. µ1 ≥ µ2.
Then, R∗N,1 ≥ R
∗
N,2.
Proof To prove this result, we split our proof into two parts as we did in the M/G/1/∞
case. First, we show that the result holds when conditions 1 and 2 are replaced by equalities.
Second, we show that it holds when conditions 3 and 4 are equalities. By composition, the
result holds under all conditions as well.
Suppose that conditions 3 and 4 hold and Λ1 = Λ2 and F1(·) = F2(·). Recall that for
all y ≥ 0,
Ri(y, N) = yλi(y)(1 − πN (ρi(y), N)) − hiL(ρi(y), N).
Conditions 3 and 4 imply that h1L(ρ1(y), N) ≤ h2L(ρ2(y), N) and that πN (ρ1(y), N) ≤






When conditions 1 and 2 hold but conditions 3 and 4 are equalities, the proof is similar
to the proof of Proposition 3.2.3 and is omitted. 2
The following theorem shows that the infinite capacity model can be approximated by
a finite capacity model of large size provided that it is stable for all prices. We show that
both the optimal reward and optimal price of a finite capacity model converge to those of
an infinite capacity system as the system size grows to infinity.






∞ as N → ∞.
We need the following lemma before proving Theorem 3.2.3.
Lemma 3.2.1 Under the stability condition Λ < µ, R(y, N) → R(y,∞) uniformly in y as
N converges to infinity.
Proof Let y ≥ 0. Consider





Now consider a system with capacity N with posted price y and reward corresponding to
this price








We observe that πN (ρ(y), N) = ρ(y)
N 1−ρ(y)
1−ρ(y)N+1
→ 0 uniformly in y as N tends to infinity.
In the same fashion, π0(ρ(y), N) =
1−ρ(y)
1−ρ(y)N+1











→ 0 uniformly in y. Therefore, R(y, N) → R(y,∞)
uniformly in y as N goes to infinity, which proves the desired result. 2
Proof of Theorem 3.2.3 According to the previous lemma, R(y, N) → R(y,∞) uniformly
in y. Therefore, R∗N converges to R
∗
∞ as N goes to infinity.
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Let {y∗
N(m)} be a converging (to y) subsequence of {y
∗
N}. Before we proceed, we need to
show that such a subsequence exists and that y < ∞. Since y∗N ≥ 0 for all N , it suffices to
show that y∗N does not converge to infinity as N tends to infinity. Suppose that lim y
∗
N = ∞.
Note that R∗N = R(y
∗








N → 0 as N tends infinity, R
∗
N → 0.
But this is a contradiction since we showed that R∗N → R
∗
∞ > 0. Therefore, {y
∗
N(m)} exists
and has a finite limit.
To simplify the notation in the remainder of the proof, we use N instead of N(m). Next,




∞, this implies that
























































First, let N go to infinity and then let M go to infinity. Consequently, π0(ρ(y
∗
N ), N) →
π0(ρ(y),∞).
We also have
R(y,∞) − R∗N =µy(1 − π0(ρ(y),∞)) − µy
∗
















So, for an arbitrary integer M between 1 and N ,
|R(y,∞) − R∗N | ≤µ|y(1 − π0(ρ(y),∞)) − y
∗



























|R(y,∞) − R∗N | ≤µ|y(1 − π0(ρ(y),∞)) − y
∗





















First, let N go to infinity and then M go to infinity. We have R∗N → R(y,∞) for any
converging subsequence. Therefore, R(y,∞) = R∗∞, so y = y
∗
∞ is optimal for the infinite
capacity system. Since the limit is unique, any converging subsequence y∗N has the limit
y∗∞. Hence, y = y
∗
∞ = limN→∞ y
∗
N . 2
3.2.3 Optimal Capacity in M/M/1/N Queues
We showed that the infinite capacity model can be approximated by a finite capacity model
of large size under the condition Λ < µ. A natural question that stems from this result
is whether there is a capacity level that maximizes the reward. Indeed, in our analysis so
far, capacity is a given parameter. Now, we relax this constraint by allowing the service
provider to set the capacity of the service facility in addition to the price. Note that
the chosen capacity could be finite or infinite. Ziya [24] shows that systems with larger
capacities always perform better when there is no holding cost. In this case, the service
provider should have an infinite capacity system in order to maximize revenue. Thus, no
customer is ever turned down due to capacity limitations. However, when h > 0, there is
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a trade-off between large capacity and high holding costs. In the following, we show the
existence of a capacity level N∗ < ∞ that maximizes revenue when Λ < µ and h > 0.
Proposition 3.2.7 If Λ < µ and h > 0, then there exists a capacity level N∗ < ∞, such
that R∗N∗ = supN R
∗
N . Consequently, there exists an optimal solution to supy,N R(y, N).
We need the following lemma in order to prove Proposition 3.2.7.
Lemma 3.2.2 If Λ < µ and h > 0 , then, ∀B ≥ 0, there exists N ∈ IN such that for all
y ≤ B, R(y, N) is nonincreasing for N ≥ N .
Proof Let B ≥ 0. Instead of N being restricted to integer values, let N attain real values.
Note that R(y, N) is differentiable with respect to N . We will show that for all y ≤ B and
N large enough, ∂R(y,N)
∂N











−µB ln(ρ(B)) + h
(













Therefore, there exists N ∈ IN such that for all y ≤ B and h > 0, RN (y) is nonincreasing
in N for N ≥ N . 2
Proof of Proposition 3.2.7 We showed in Theorem 3.2.3 that y∗N converges to y
∗
∞. Therefore,
let y = supN{y
∗
N} < ∞. We use Lemma 3.2.2 to define
N = 1 + max{N : ∃y ≤ y, R(y, N + 1) > R(y, N)}.
For y ≤ y and N ≥ N , we have R(y, N + 1) ≤ R(y, N). So, for N ≥ N ,
R∗N+1 = sup
y≤y
R(y, N + 1) ≤ sup
y≤y
R(y, N) = R∗N .
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Therefore, R∗N is nonincreasing for N ≥ N , which implies that R
∗
N∗ = supN R
∗
N exists. 2
3.3 Systems with Balking Customers
In this section, we capture congestion penalties through balking customers.
3.3.1 Optimal Pricing in M/M/1 Queues
The model for the arrival, service and willingness-to-pay processes is the same as in the
holding cost model with h = 0; that is, no holding cost is incurred. However, we suppose
that potential customers make their decision to enter the system (if it is not full) based both
on price and congestion. Therefore, we assume that each customer not only has a random
willingness-to-pay but also a random willingness-to-wait. A customer’s willingness-to-wait
is the maximum current occupancy of the system so that the customer is willing to enter
the facility. The customers’ willingness-to-wait process forms a collection of independent,
identically distributed discrete random variables. Hence, when s < N customers are in
system, an arriving customer who is willing to pay the advertised price accepts to join the
system with probability ps. We assume that {ps : s ≥ 0} is nonincreasing in s, since cus-
tomers are more likely to be deterred by high congestion levels. Without loss of generality,
we suppose that p0 = 1. To ensure the stability of the system when N = ∞, we suppose
that Λ lims ps < µ. To ease the notation in the following, we define Pn =
∏n
s=0 ps, for
s = 1, . . . , N − 1 and P−1 = 1.
As opposed to the holding cost model, we need not break down our work into the analysis
of finite capacity queues and infinite capacity queues. We generally assume that N ≤ ∞.
However, we assume that the service times are Markovian with rate µ.
Hence, the customer admission process under static price y is a conditional (doubly
stochastic) Poisson process with rate 1X(t)<NpX(t)λ(y). In the same fashion, the departure
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process is a conditional Poisson process with rate µ1X(t)>0. Under price y, the queueing
system behaves as a Markovian birth-death process with birth rates pX(t)λ(y) and death
rate µ as described in Figure 2.
Waiting room Servers
w.p. p_s(1-F(y))





Figure 2: System with Balking Customers







, n = 0, . . . , N.














Note that the reward differs from state to state as customers now react to both congestion
and prices. Since the system is stable, all entering (paying) customers eventually get serviced
and depart the system after a finite waiting time. Hence, we can also express the average
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reward as









In the following theorem, we show that exists a unique optimal price that maximizes
the long-run average reward. We explicitly characterize this price in a similar fashion as in
Theorems 3.2.1 and 3.2.2.
Theorem 3.3.1 There exists a unique optimal price given by :
y∗N = inf{y : yr(y)γ
b












, ρ ≥ 0.
Proof The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 3.2.2. First, we prove that there
exists an optimal price. Since F (·) is absolutely continuous, R(y, N) is continuous and a.e.
differentiable on [α, β). Note that R(y, N) → 0 as y → β and that R(y, N) > 0 in [α, β).
Therefore, there exists an optimal price in [α, β).
Next, we prove the uniqueness of the optimal price. After some algebra, we show that



















Note that, the above holds when N = ∞ as we interchange derivative and summation
signs for power series of ρ within the radius of convergence.
If R(y, N) is differentiable with respect to y ∈ [α, β), then ∂R(y,N)
∂y
> 0(< 0) if and only
if yr(y)γbN (ρ(y)) < 1(> 1).
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Since there exists y in [α, β) such that R(y, N) > 0 and R(y, N) → 0 as y → β, there
exists y in [α, β) such that yr(y)γbN (ρ(y)) > 1. Under Assumption IGHR and using Lemma
A.0.2, yr(y)γbN (ρ(y)) is strictly increasing in [α, β), so R(y, N) is decreasing in the interval
(inf{y : yr(y)γbN (ρ(y)) ≥ 1}, β). In the same fashion, R(y, N) is increasing in the interval
(α, inf{y : yr(y)γbN (ρ(y)) ≥ 1}). Therefore, there exists a unique optimal price given by
y∗N = inf{y : yr(y)γ
b
N (ρ(y)) ≥ 1}. 2
3.3.2 Properties of Optimal Prices and Optimal Profit
In the following, we investigate the sensitivity of optimal prices and optimal profits as
parameters change. We compare two systems 1 and 2 that are identical except for some
parameter whose ordering is known. Note that subscripts 1 and 2 refer to system 1 and 2,
respectively.






2. F1 ≥HR F2 .
Then, y∗N,1 ≥ y
∗
N,2.
Proof From Theorem 3.3.1, we have y∗N,i = inf{y : yri(y)γ
b
N (ρi(y)) ≥ 1} for system i = 1, 2.
Since hazard rate ordering implies stochastic ordering, F1 ≥ST F2. Using condition 1, this
implies that ρ1(·) ≥ ρ2(·). Moreover, we showed in Lemma A.0.2 that γ
b
N (·) is nonincreasing.
Therefore, we have γbN (ρ1(·)) ≤ γ
b
N (ρ2(·)). Suppose that y is such that yr1(y)γ
b
N (ρ1(y)) ≥ 1.
Then, yr2(y)γ
b





When congestion penalties are captured through balking customers, we note that opti-
mal prices are ordered with the maximum traffic intensity Λ
µ
, whereas it does not hold in
32
the model with holding costs. We are also interested in the parameter sensitivity of the
optimal reward. For instance, when Λ increases, more customers are admitted into the
system. This generates more revenue on the one hand but also increases congestion and
deters future potential customers on the other hand. In the next proposition, we show how
the optimal reward varies as some parameters are increased or decreased.
Proposition 3.3.2 Consider two systems 1 and 2 that satisfy all of the following :
1. Λ1 ≥ Λ2,
2. F1 ≥ST F2,
3. µ1 ≥ µ2.
Then, R∗N,1 ≥ R
∗
N,2.
Proof To prove this result, we split our proof into two parts. First, we show that the result
holds when conditions 1 and 2 are changed to equalities. Second, we show that it holds
when condition 3 is changed into an equality. By composition, the result holds under all
the conditions as well.
Suppose that condition 3 holds and Λ1 = Λ2 and F1(·) = F2(·). We will show that the




= y(1 − π0(ρ(y), N))
(
1 − γbN (ρ(y))
)
.
From Lemma A.0.2, γbN (·) is nonincreasing, so γ
b
N (ρ(y)) ≤ γ
b
N (0) = 1 for all y in [α, β).
Therefore, R(y, N) is nondecreasing in µ and R∗N,1 ≥ R
∗
N,2.
Now suppose that 1 and 2 hold, whereas 3 is an equality. Since F1(·) is absolutely






system 1 with price y∗N,2 + δ has the same arrival and service rates as system 2 with price
y∗N,2. Therefore, system 1 with price y
∗
N,2 + δ performs better than system 2 with optimal
price. Hence, R∗N,1 ≥ R
∗
N,2 and the proof is complete. 2
In the holding cost model, we showed that system capacity was a critical parameter that
could be adjusted to improve optimal profits. We now focus on the effect of the system
capacity in the balking customer model. First, we show that optimal prices are not ordered
in the system capacity N . We provide the following counterexample. Consider a system
with Λ = 30, µ = 3, ps =
3
3+.2s for s = 0, . . . , N − 1. We suppose that customers have
an exponentially distributed willingness-to-pay (F (y) = 1 − e−y). In this case, we have
y∗3 = 2.1964, y
∗
4 = 2.1983 and y
∗
5 = 2.1960. Clearly, y
∗
N is not monotone in N . However, we
observe that R∗N is monotone in N . We prove this claim in the next proposition.









as N → ∞,
Proof First, we show that for all y ≥ 0, R(y, N) ↑ R(y,∞) uniformly in y as N converges
to infinity in order to show that R∗N ↑ R
∗
∞. Recall that for K = N or K = ∞,








Hence, we only need to show that π0(ρ(y), N) ↓ π0(ρ(y),∞) uniformly in y. Clearly,
π0(ρ(y), N) is nonincreasing in N . We also have
0 ≤ π0(ρ(y),∞)
















Since Λ lims ps < µ, π0(ρ(y), N) ↓ π0(ρ(y),∞) uniformly in y implying that R(y, N) ↑




To prove that y∗N → y
∗
∞, we use the same method as in the proof of Theorem 3.2.3. We
repeat that proof, setting h = 0 and substituting {Pn−1ρ(y)












Therefore, the model with balking customers performs best when N = ∞ with no
customer ever being turned down due to capacity limitations.
3.4 Systems with Impatient Customers
In this section, we model congestion penalties through impatient customers. As opposed
the balking customer model, customers do not react to congestion upon arrival but during
their waiting time. If a customer waits for too long before receiving service, the customer
departs the system and receives a full refund.
3.4.1 Optimal Pricing in M/M/1 Queues
We assume that the arrival, service and willingness-to-pay processes are the same as de-
scribed in the holding cost model with h = 0. Customers enter the system if it is not
full and if they are willing to pay the price posted by the service provider. Payments are
collected upon arrival. We suppose that each customer has a maximum waiting time in the
queue that is exponentially distributed with rate θ . We will refer to θ as the reneging rate.
We assume that the maximum waiting times for successive customers forms a collection of
independent, identically distributed random variables that are independent of the arrival
process and the service process. If a customer does not begin service prior to its maximum
waiting time, the customer leaves (reneges) the system after receiving a full refund of the
amount paid upon arrival. Note that customers in service are no longer subject to im-
patience. Congestion penalties are experienced the following way: as the system becomes
congested, waiting times increase and customers are more likely to become impatient, leave
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and claim a refund. Therefore, the service provider sustains losses when refunding impatient
customers.
The model’s features are represented in Figure 3.
Waiting room Servers
w.p. 1-F(y)







Figure 3: System with Impatient Customers
As in the previous section, we consider systems of finite or infinite capacity simultane-
ously (N ≤ ∞) and exponentially distributed service times with rate µ. In the case where
N = ∞, the stability of the system is ensured by impatient customers: all customers spend
a finite expected time in the system.
Since the system is stable, only customers who depart the system after receiving service
contribute to the long-run average profit. Impatient customers do not contribute to the
long-run average profit although they make the system more congested. Note that we
would observe the same long-run average profit, if payments were collected after each service
completion instead of upon arrival.
In this chapter, we assume that the service provider can only advertise one price y at all
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times. As in the holding cost model, the admission process is a conditional Poisson Process
with rate 1X(t)<Nλ(y). However, the departure process differs significantly from the holding
cost model. Customers may leave the system through service or due to impatience. Thus,
the departure process (impatient departures and service departures) forms a conditional
Poisson Process with rate 1X(t)>0(µ + (X(t) − 1)θ). The resulting queueing process is a
Markovian birth-death process with birth rates λ(y) and death rates µ + (X(t) − 1)θ.











µ+sθ , for n = 0, . . . , N − 1 and Q−1 = 1.
When price y is advertised, we can express the long-run average reward in two equivalent
ways:








(s − 1)πn(ρ(y), N), (1)
= µy(1 − π0(ρ(y), N)) (2)
In equation (1), we break down the long-run average profit into the revenue from cus-
tomers’ payments upon arrival and the refunds granted to impatient customers. Since the
system is stable and all customers spend a finite amount of time in the system, only cus-
tomers departing after service eventually contribute to the long-run average profit. Equation
(2) uses this property and expresses the long-run average profit through the payments of
serviced customers. Note that static pricing is key to deriving equation (2) since we need
not know the payment history of all customers to compute the long-run average profit. We
discuss this topic in further details in Section 4.2.3.
In the following theorem, we show that there exists a unique optimal price that maxi-
mizes the long-run average reward. We provide an explicit expression for the optimal price
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to be charged.
Theorem 3.4.1 There exists a unique optimal price given by :
y∗N = inf{y : yr(y)γ
r












, ρ ≥ 0.
To prove this theorem, we notice analytical similarities with the model with balking
customers. If the sequence {ps} is defined as ps =
µ
µ+sθ , the maximization problem with
balking customers becomes analytically equivalent to the one with impatient customers.
Therefore, both models yield identical optimal prices and profits in the particular case
when ps =
µ
µ+sθ , s = 0, . . . , N − 1. We use this feature in the proof of Lemma A.0.3.
Proof of Theorem 3.4.1 First, we show in Lemma A.0.3 that γrN (ρ(y)) is nonincreasing.
Substituting γr(·) for γb(·), the remainder of the proof is identical to the proof of Theorem
3.3.1 and is omitted. 2
We managed to show the existence of a unique optimal price that maximizes the long-
run average reward per unit time. We noted that the optimization problem with impatient
customers can be analytically treated as a particular case of the balking customers model
with ps =
µ
µ+sθ , s = 0, . . . , N − 1. This property becomes handy as we can refer to Section
3.3.2 when proving the next results.
3.4.2 Properties of Optimal Prices and Optimal Profit
We now investigate the sensitivity of optimal prices and optimal profits to system para-
meters. As previously, our objective is to show how optimal prices changes when system
parameters increase or decrease. In the next two results, we compare two systems 1 and
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2 that are identical except for some parameters that we specify. Parameters for system
i = 1, 2 bear the additional subscript i.
Proposition 3.4.1 Consider two systems 1 and 2 that satisfy all the following :
1. Λ1 ≥ Λ2,
2. F1 ≥HR F2.
Then, y∗N,1 ≥ y
∗
N,2.
Proof From Lemma A.0.3, recall that γrN (·) is nonincreasing. The rest of the proof is
identical to the proof of Proposition 3.3.1 with µ1 = µ2, after subsituting γ
r




As opposed to the balking customers model, there is no optimal price ordering with
respect to Λ
µ
. We provide the following counterexample. Consider two systems 1 and 2 with





. The optimal price to
be charged when N = 4 is y∗4,1 = 1.1362 and y
∗
4,2 = 1.1702 for system 1 and 2, respectively.
Note that y∗4,1 < y
∗




Next, we focus on how the optimal long-run average profit varies when parameters
change. For instance, it is intuitive that the higher reneging rate or the service rate, the
more profitable the system. We formally prove this intuition in the next proposition.
Proposition 3.4.2 Consider two systems 1 and 2 that satisfy all the following :
1. Λ1 ≥ Λ2,
2. F1 ≥ST F2,
3. θ1 ≤ θ2,
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4. µ1 ≥ µ2.
Then, R∗N,1 ≥ R
∗
N,2.
Proof We proceed by composition. We will show that the result holds when conditions 1, 2
and 3 hold, while µ1 = µ2. Then, we show that the result holds when condition 4 holds and
conditions 1,2 and 3 are modified into equalities. By composition, R∗N,1 ≥ R
∗
N,2 must then
hold under all conditions.
Suppose that conditions 1, 2 and 3 hold, while µ1 = µ2 = µ. This clearly implies that
π0,1(ρ1(y), N)) ≤ π0,2(ρ2(y), N)). Recall that Ri(y, N) = µy(1 − π0,i(ρi(y), N)). Therefore,




N,2. Now suppose that Λ1 = Λ2 = Λ, F1(·) = F2(·) =
F (·) and θ1 = θ2 = θ while µ1 ≥ µ2. Recall from (1) that for y ≥ 0 and i = 1, 2,








(s − 1)πn(ρ(y), N),
= λ(y)y(1 − πN (ρi(y), N)) − θyL
q(ρi(y), N),
where Lq(ρi(y), N) is the average queue size under traffic intensity ρi(y). To make our
notation consistent in the case when N = ∞, we suppose that π∞(·,∞) = 0. Since µ1 ≥ µ2,
we have ρ1(·) ≤ ρ2(·). Consequently, πN (ρ1(y), N) ≤ πN (ρ2(y), N) and L
q(ρ1(y), N) ≤




N,2. By composition, the
proof is complete. 2
We now investigate how the optimal price and reward react to a change in system
capacity. Not surprisingly, the results are similar to those of the balking customer model.
First, we show that optimal prices are not ordered in the system capacity N . We provide the
following counterexample inspired by the one given in Section 3.3.2. Consider a system with
Λ = 30, µ = 3, θ = .2 and an exponentially distributed willingness-to-pay (F (y) = 1− e−y).
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In this case, we have y∗3 = 2.1964, y
∗
4 = 2.1983 and y
∗
5 = 2.1960. Clearly, y
∗
N is not monotone
in N . However, we note that R(y, N) is nondecreasing in N . This property is derived from
(2) as π0(ρ(y), N) is nonincreasing in N . Hence, R
∗
N is nondecreasing in N . We refine this
result in the following proposition. We show that the optimal price and reward of finite
capacity system of large size converges to those of an infinite capacity system. The proof
of this proposition is identical to the proof of Proposition 3.3.3 using {Qn} in lieu of {Pn}
and is omitted.







Thus, systems with infinite capacity perform better that systems with finite capacity.
Moreover, the optimal price and reward of a finite capacity system converge to those of an
infinite capacity system when N grows to ∞.
3.5 Summary
In this chapter, we studied the optimal static pricing problem in a service facility modelled
as single server queueing system subject to congestion penalties. Our objective has been to
maximize the service provider’s long-run average profit per unit time when only one price
can be advertised at all times. Depending on whether there is a limit on the number of
customers in the system, we considered systems of finite or infinite capacity. We successively
analyzed three different ways in which the system congestion affects profit: holding costs,
balking customers and impatient customers.
For each of the three congestion models, we showed the existence of unique optimal
price to be charged. We derived expressions for the optimal price in each case. We also
investigated how optimal prices and rewards vary as system parameters change. More
specifically, we studied the influence of the system capacity N on optimal prices and rewards.
41
Although we noticed that optimal prices are not monotone with respect to capacity N in any
of the three congestion models, system capacity is a critical parameter in order to improve
optimal rewards. We showed that for all three congestion models, the optimal prices and
rewards of a system with finite capacity converge to those of an unlimited capacity system.
Moreover, in the holding cost model, we showed that there exists a finite capacity level
that maximizes profit. Therefore, if the service provider has control over N , it does not
make economic sense to have unlimited room for waiting customers when holding costs are
incurred. It turns out that unlimited capacity incurs higher holding costs that could be
avoided by limiting the number of customers in the system. Nevertheless, this does not
hold for balking or impatient customers. For these two models, it is best to have unlimited





In this chapter, the service provider can dynamically adjust prices. Similarly to Chapter 3,
we model the service facility as queueing system with finite or infinite capacity N . However,
the queueing models we consider in this chapter have more general features than in the static
pricing case. As in Chapter 3, we consider each of the three types of congestion penalties
separately in three different models. This enables us to identify key properties and features
of our solutions that are specific to the way congestion penalties are modelled.
In this chapter, we refine our framework by segmenting customers into I classes. Cus-
tomers from class i = 1, . . . , I arrive according to a Poisson process with parameter Λi > 0.
The arrival processes from customer classes are independent of each other. Note that this
formulation is equivalent to having arriving customers randomly assigned to a specific class
independently of everything else. The service provider can identify customers’ classes upon
arrival and can advertise class-specific prices. This ability is referred to as precision pricing .
In this dissertation, we only consider dynamic precision pricing since Ziya [22] investigates
precision pricing in the static case.
The maximum amounts that successive class i = 1, . . . , I customers are willing to pay
are independent, identically distributed random variables with distribution Fi. The amount
a class i = 1, . . . , I customer is willing to pay is independent of the amount a class j =
1, . . . , I customer is willing to pay for i 6= j. For all i = 1, . . . , I, we assume that the
cumulative distribution function Fi(·) is absolutely continuous with density fi(·), support
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(αi, βi) and finite mean. Let ri(·) denote the hazard rate function of Fi(·); that is, ri(z) =
fi(z)
1−Fi(z)
for αi < z < βi. In all the following, we assume that Fi has IGHR (Increasing
Generalized Hazard Rate); that is, zri(z) is strictly increasing for all z in [αi, βi]. The
service provider can advertise different prices to different classes. Without loss of generality,
only prices in [αi, βi] can be advertised to class-i customers.
We define the state of the system X(t) as the number of customers in the system at time
t. Let z ∈ [α1, β1]
N ×. . .×[αI , βI ]
N be a pricing (decision) rule, where price zi,s is advertised
to class-i customers when the system is in state s. Since there is a one-to-one relationship
between decision rules and stationary policies, in an abuse of notation, we also denote by z
the stationary pricing policy corresponding to the pricing rule z; that is, z also denotes the
policy of using pricing rule z at every decision epoch (see p. 20 of Puterman [18] for further
details). Customers enter the system if it is not full and if they are willing to pay the price
posted by the service provider upon arrival. In systems with balking customers, customers’
decision to enter the system is also subject to the customers’ willingness-to-wait as described
in Section 3.3; the willingness-to-wait distribution is assumed to be same across customer
classes. Hence, the admission process of customers under the stationary pricing policy z





i=1 λi(zi,X(t)) in systems with balking customers), where λi(z) = Λi(1 −
Fi(z)). In the same fashion, the service process is a conditional Poisson process with rate
µX(t)1X(t)>0. Unless otherwise stated, {µs} are positive real numbers that are nondecreasing
in s. Hence, the queueing system behaves as a Markovian birth-death process.
We let g∗N denote the optimal dynamic average profit per unit time under capacity N over
the set of all history-dependent randomized policies (see p.35-36 in Puterman [18]). Under
stationary pricing policy z, we denote the objective function by R(z) and the stationary
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probability distribution by {πs(z)} . If there exists a unique optimal stationary pricing
policy that maximizes the long-run average profit per unit time, we denote it by z∗; that
is, R(z∗) = g∗N .
We separate systems with finite capacity from systems with infinite capacity in our
work. Indeed, we make extra assumptions and we use results from finite capacity systems
in order to analyze systems of infinite capacity. In the following section, we focus on service
facilities with finite capacity.
4.2 Queueing Systems with Finite Capacity
First, we consider the case of systems with finite capacity (N < ∞).
4.2.1 Systems with Holding Costs
In this section, the service facility is subject to holding costs. The service provider must
pay a holding cost hs per unit time spent in state s, where 0 = h0 ≤ h1 ≤ . . . ≤ hN as it
becomes more expensive to accommodate a larger number of customers. We assume that
h1
µ1
< max βi so that we have an attainable positive reward. Note that this structure is more
general than having each customer incur a holding cost per unit time spent in the system
where hs = hs.
We use a Markov decision process (MDP) formulation to exhibit an optimal stationary
policy. Note that the MDP associated with our system behaves as a birth-death process,
with positive death rates, where the decision maker only controls the arrival rates. There-
fore, the MDP is unichain for all stationary policies. We set up the system of average-cost
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i=1 λi(zi)(zi + l(s + 1)) + µsl(s − 1) − g − hs
∑I
i=1 λi(zi) + µs
}
, if 0 ≤ s ≤ N − 1,




where g is the gain and l(·) is the bias vector. Since the value of µ0 does not matter as long
as it is positive, we will consider µ0 = µ1 without loss of generality. In this system, we are
solving for g and l(·).
We can transform these equations into a simpler equivalent form by letting G(−1) = 0
and G(s) = l(s) − l(s + 1), for s = 0, . . . , N − 1. Then,
G(−1) = 0, (3)






{(z − G(s))λi(z)}, if s = 0, . . . , N − 1, (4)




If a solution (g, G(·), z) to the ACOE system exists, we call it a canonical triplet, where z
are prices that achieve the suprema in (4). Precisely, for s = 0, . . . , N − 1 and i = 1, . . . , I,
the component zi,s of z satisfies zi,s = arg sup{(z − G(s))λi(z)}.
In the following theorem, we explicitly characterize a unique optimal stationary policy.
Theorem 4.2.1 There exists a canonical triplet (g, G(·), z) for the ACOE system (3)-(5).
Moreover, the optimal long-run average reward is g∗N = g and z
∗ = z is a unique optimal
stationary policy, where, for s = 0, . . . , N − 1 and i = 1, . . . , I,
z∗i,s = inf {z : ri(z)(z − G(s)) ≥ 1} .
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Before proving this theorem, we need the following two lemmas. Let G(s, g) be the
solution of (4) and (5) for g ≥ 0.
Lemma 4.2.1 For all s = −1, . . . , N − 1, G(s, ·) is nondecreasing and continuous. More-
over, there exists g ≥ 0 such that G(−1, g) = 0.
Proof Note that G(N − 1, g) = g+hN
µN
is continuous and nondecreasing in g. Suppose that
G(s, g) is nondecreasing and continuous in g for some state s between 0 and N − 1. As
sup{λi(z)(z−G(s, g))} is the supremum of a bounded continuous function of z, we can claim
that µsG(s − 1, g) = g −
∑I
i=1 sup{λi(z)(z − G(s, g))} is continuous and nondecreasing in
g. By induction, for all s = −1, . . . , N − 1, G(s, ·) is nondecreasing and continuous.
To complete the proof, we will show that G(−1, 0) ≤ 0 and that there exists gb > 0 such
that G(−1, gb) ≥ 0. Hence, by continuity, there exists g ∈ [0, gb] such that G(−1, g) = 0.
We know that −µ0G(−1, 0) =
∑I
i=1 sup{λi(z)(z − G(0, 0))} ≥ 0. Therefore, G(−1, 0) ≤ 0.
Now consider gb =
∑I
i=1 sup{λi(z)z}. Note that G(N − 1, gb) =
gb+hN
µN
≥ 0. Suppose that
G(s, gb) ≥ 0 for some s = 0, . . . , N − 1, then









Therefore, µsG(s − 1, gb) ≥ gb + hs −
∑I
i=1 sup{λi(z)z} ≥ 0. By induction, G(−1, gb) ≥ 0.
2
Lemma 4.2.2 Let (g, G(·), z) be a canonical triplet. Then, for all s = −1, . . . , N − 1,
0 ≤ G(s) ≤ g+hs+1
µs+1
.
Proof For all s = 0, . . . , N − 1, sup{(z − G(s))λi(z)} ≥ 0. Therefore, we have G(s −
1) ≤ g+hs
µs
from equation (4). Using equations (3) and (5) as well, G(s) ≤ g+hs+1
µs+1
for all
s = −1, . . . , N − 1.
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Now suppose that there exists s = 0, . . . , N − 1 such that G(s) < 0. Since G(−1) ≥ 0,



























i=1 λi(zi,s+1) = 0, then G(s) =
g+hs+1
µs+1
≥ 0, which is impossible. Therefore, G(s + 1) <
G(s) < 0. Since µs+2 ≥ µs+1, we have µs+2G(s + 1) < µs+1G(s) < 0. Consequently, we
can repeat the argument above until we reach state N − 1, for which G(N − 1) < 0. But
G(N − 1) = g+hN
µN
≥ 0, which yields a contradiction. Therefore, for all s = −1, . . . , N − 1,
0 ≤ G(s) ≤ g+hs+1
µs+1
. 2
Proof of Theorem 4.2.1 The existence of a canonical triplet (g, G(·), z) to (3)-(5) is a direct
consequence of Lemma 4.2.1. Since the state space is finite, we can refer to equation (5.2.12)
in Lasserre and Hernández-Lerma [11] to prove that the canonical triplet (g, G(·), z) is an
optimal solution. Therefore, g∗N = g and z
∗ = z.
It remains to show that z∗i,s = inf{z : ri(z)(z − G(s)) ≥ 1} and that it is the unique
optimal stationary policy. For s = 0, . . . , N − 1, and i = 1, . . . , I, let
vi,s(z) = λi(z)(z − G(s)),
v′i,s(z) = (1 − Fi(z)) − fi(z)(z − G(s)), a.e. on [αi, βi].
Note also that v′i,s(z) > (<)0 is equivalent to ri(z)(z−G(s)) < (>)1. The IGHR assumption
implies that ri(z)(z − G(s)) ≥ 1 almost everywhere on (inf{z : ri(z)(z − G(s)) ≥ 1}, βi).
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Therefore, v′i,s(·) > 0 almost everywhere on (αi, inf{z : ri(z)(z −G(s)) ≥ 1}) and v
′
i,s(·) < 0
almost everywhere on (inf{z : ri(z)(z − G(s)) ≥ 1}, βi). Thus, vi,s(·) is strictly unimodal
and z∗i,s = inf{z : ri(z)(z − G(s)) ≥ 1} is its unique maximizer on [αi, βi].
We still need to show that z∗ is the unique optimal stationary policy. Under IGHR, z∗i,s





1)− hs for all zi 6= z
∗
i,s. Since we have a unichain model, we can refer to Proposition 8.5.10
in Puterman [18] to prove the uniqueness of the optimal stationary policy z∗. 2
We are now able to characterize an optimal stationary policy explicitly. Note that it
might be possible that z∗i,s = βi for some state s. In this case, it is optimal for the service
provider not to accept customers of class i when in state s. However, this can only happen
if the class-i customers’ willingness-to-pay distribution has finite support. Indeed, if Fi has
infinite support, then for all s = 0, . . . , N − 1, sup{λi(z)(z −G(s))} > 0 and z
∗
i,s < ∞ = βi.
Moreover, note that z∗i,s = inf{z : (z − G(s))ri(z) ≥ 1} ≥ inf{z : zri(z) ≥ 1}. Since
inf{z : zri(z) ≥ 1} is the optimal price to charge when demand function is 1 − Fi(z), we
observe that holding costs and capacity limitations force the service provider to charge
higher prices than she normally would if she had no constraints.
We will now exhibit structural properties of the derived optimal stationary policy. More
specifically, we are in interested in the monotonicity of the optimal stationary policy. In the
next Proposition, we demonstrate that the optimal prices to be charged are nondecreasing
in the state index.




s=0 are such that there exists an integer q
between 0 and N , where µ0 ≤ µ1 ≤ . . . ≤ µq = µq+1 = . . . = µN and 0 = h0 = h1 = . . . =
hq ≤ hq+1 ≤ . . . ≤ hN . Then, z
∗
i,s is nondecreasing in s.
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To prove this result, we need the following lemma.




s=0 are such that there exists an integer q between
0 and N , where µ0 ≤ µ1 ≤ . . . ≤ µq = µq+1 = . . . = µN and 0 = h0 = h1 = . . . = hq ≤
hq+1 ≤ . . . ≤ hN . Then, G(·) is nondecreasing.
Proof We decompose our proof into two parts. We will prove first by induction that
G(s) is nondecreasing for states s = 0, . . . , q − 1. Then, we will show the same for states
s = q − 1, . . . , N − 1.
Suppose G(s − 1) ≤ G(s) for some state s = 0, . . . , q − 2, which is true when s = 0.




sup{λi(z)(z − G(s + 1))} = g
∗
N − µs+1G(s)




























i,s) = 0. It implies that














sup{λi(z)(z − G(s))} = 0.






= G(s − 1) and
∑I
i=1 sup{λi(z)(z − G(s − 2))} ≤
∑I




. By induction, G(s − 1) ≤ G(s) holds for s = 0, . . . , q − 1.
If q = N , the proof is complete. Otherwise, it remains to show by induction that
G(s−1) ≤ G(s) for states s = q, . . . , N −1. Recall that G(N −1) =
g∗N+hN
µN




. Therefore, G(N − 2) ≤
g∗N+hN−1
µN
= G(N − 1). Now suppose that G(s) ≥ G(s− 1)
for some state s = q + 1, . . . , N − 1. Then,









sup{λi(z)(z − G(s − 1))}
≤ g∗N − hs−1 − µNG(s − 2).
Hence, µN (G(s − 1) − G(s − 2)) ≥ hs − hs−1 ≥ 0. By induction, G(s) ≥ G(s − 1) for
s = q, . . . , N − 1 and the proof is complete. 2
Proof of Proposition 4.2.1 Recall that z∗i,s = inf{z : ri(z)(z − G(s)) ≥ 1}. Since G(s) is
nondecreasing in s, so is z∗i,s. 2
Therefore, in queues with the holding cost and service rate structure described above
(such as multiple server systems), the service provider charges more as the system becomes
congested. As a consequence, the admission rates are nonincreasing with respect to the
number of people in the system. Hence, the optimal policy performs a congestion control




i,s) > 0 for all s < q − 1. This property is quite intuitive since states 0 through q
do not incur any holding cost, so that it is not profitable for the service provider to refuse
entrance to customers in those states.
We are now interested in how the system reacts to an increase in capacity. A larger
buffer size affects the holding costs as well as the revenue by welcoming more customers.
As capacity increases, we show that the optimal prices decrease state by state whereas
the optimal reward increases. In the following, subscripts 1 and 2 identify parameters for
systems 1 and 2, respectively.
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Proposition 4.2.2 Consider two systems 1 and 2, where system 1 has capacity N and
system 2 has capacity N + 1. Then, g∗N+1 ≥ g
∗
N . If for all s = 0, . . . , N − 1, there exists





Proof It is straightforward to show that g∗N+1 ≥ g
∗
N since the action space for system 2
includes the action space for system 1.
















sup{λi(z)(z − G1(s))} = 0.
The latter case is impossible since it implies that z∗i,s,1 = z
∗
i,s,2 = βi for all i. So,












> µsG1(s − 1).
By induction, 0 = G2(−1) > G1(−1) = 0, which yields a contradiction. Therefore, for all





We analyze now how the optimal reward varies as other parameters change. As earlier,
subscripts 1 and 2 refer to system 1 and 2 respectively. For instance, if customers are willing
to pay more, revenue increases but so do the system congestion and holding costs. In the
next proposition, we characterize the sensitivity of the optimal reward to the willingness-
to-pay distribution as well as other system parameters.
Proposition 4.2.3 Consider two systems 1 and 2 that satisfy all of the following :
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1. Λi,1 ≥ Λi,2, for i = 1, . . . , I,
2. Fi,1 ≥ST Fi,2, for i = 1, . . . , I,
3. hs,1 ≤ hs,2, for s = 0, . . . , N ,
4. µs,1 ≥ µs,2, for s = 1, . . . , N .
Then, g∗N,1 ≥ g
∗
N,2.
Proof We will prove the result by contradiction. Suppose that conditions 1,2,3 and 4 hold
and g∗N,1 < g
∗






= G2(N − 1). Suppose that
G1(s) < G2(s) for some s = 0, . . . , N − 1. Then,










≤ g∗N,1 + hs,1 − µs,1G1(s − 1)).
So, G1(s − 1) < G2(s − 1). By induction, 0 = G1(−1) < G2(−1) = 0, exhibiting a
contradiction. Thus, g∗N,1 ≥ g
∗
N,2. 2
We now compare our optimal policy with the optimal static price we derived in Theorem
3.2.2. Suppose now that µs = µ, hs = hs, for all s = 0, . . . , N and that I = 1 as in Chapter
3. It is clear that dynamic pricing achieves a better optimal profit. Moreover, there is an
ordering relationship between our optimal static price and our optimal stationary policy. As
in Chapter 3, recall that πn(ρ, N) denote the stationary probability of n customers in the
system under static pricing when traffic intensity is ρ. Recall also that L(ρ, N) is the long-
run expected number of customers in the system under static pricing and traffic intensity
ρ.
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Proposition 4.2.4 Let I = 1 and let y∗N denote the optimal static price for a system of





Proof Since I = 1, we will omit the class subscript in this proof. For instance, we will write
r(·), λ(y) and z∗s instead of r1(·), λ1(y) and z
∗
1,s. In this proof, we also use the quantity ρ(y)
that is defined as ρ(y) = λ(y)
µ
.
Recall that z∗N−1 = inf{y : r(y)(y −
g∗+Nh
µ





ϕN (ρ(y))) ≥ 1} from Theorem 3.2.2.
To prove that y∗N ≤ z
∗




we have r(y)γhN (ρ(y))(y −
h
µ








≤ yπ0(ρ(y), N) −
h
µ
(N − L(ρ(y), N))








Hence, we have r(y)γhN (ρ(y))(y −
h
µ





To prove that z∗0 ≤ y
∗
N , we proceed by contradiction. Recall the alternate expression
of z∗0 from Lemma B.0.6, which is z
∗
0 = sup{y : g
∗
Nr(y) ≤ λ(y)}. If z
∗
0 = β, then g
∗
N = 0,
which is impossible. Suppose that β > z∗0 > y
∗










ϕN (ρ(y))) > 1. Using inequalities (2) and (4) from








≤λ(y)(1 − πN (ρ(y), N))y − hL(ρ(y), N)
≤g∗N .
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ϕN (ρ(y))) > λ(y), exhibiting a contradiction.
Thus, we have proved that z∗0 ≤ y
∗
N . 2




N−1. We can interpret the optimal
static price as a “compromise” between z∗0 and z
∗
N−1. On the one hand, when the system
is empty, the service provider is willing to discount prices to attract customers. On the
other hand, when the system is almost full, the service provider charges a premium for
higher congestion costs. Under a static pricing scheme, the service provider does not have
the possibility to differentiate states when pricing service. Hence, it is intuitive that the
optimal price to be charged in this case lies in between the optimal dynamic prices charged
in extremal states.
4.2.2 Systems with Balking Customers
We now consider systems with balking customers to capture congestion penalties. As in
Section 3.3, customers entering the system are subject to their willingness-to-wait as well as
their willingness-to-pay. A potential customer from any class arriving when the system is in
state s decides to accept the current congestion level with probability ps independently of
everything else. We assume that 1 = p0 ≥ p1 ≥ . . . ≥ pN−1 as customers are more deterred
by congested states.
As in the holding cost model, we use a Markov decision process (MDP) method. Under
any pricing policy, the queue system is unichain as a birth-death process with positive death
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rates. We have the following ACOE system:
G(−1) = 0, (6)






{λi(z)(z − G(s))}, if s = 0, . . . , N − 1, (7)




In the following theorem, we explicitly characterize a unique optimal stationary policy
that maximize the long-run average profit. We give an explicit expression for the optimal
prices to be charges in each state for each customer class.
Theorem 4.2.2 There exists a canonical triplet (g, G(·), z) for the ACOE system (6)-(8).
Moreover, the optimal long-run average reward is g∗N = g and z
∗ = z is a unique optimal
stationary policy, where, for s = 0, . . . , N − 1 and i = 1, . . . , I,
z∗i,s = inf{z : ri(z)(z − G(s)) ≥ 1}.
To show the existence of a canonical triplet, the proof is similar to the proof of Lemma
4.2.1 and is omitted. The remainder of Theorem 4.2.2 is proved similarly to Theorem 4.2.1
and we omit the proof as well. We state some useful properties of canonical triplets in the
next lemma.
Lemma 4.2.4 Let (g, G(·), z) a canonical triplet be for the ACOE system (6)-(8). Then,
1. for all s = −1, . . . , N − 1, 0 ≤ G(s) ≤ g
µs+1
.
2. for all s = 0, . . . , N − 1, there exists i = 1, . . . , I such that zi,s < βi.
Proof Let (g, G(·), z) a canonical triplet be for the ACOE system (6)-(8). First, we show that
(1) holds. From equations (7) and (8), we immediately have G(s) ≤ g
µs+1
for s = 0, . . . , N−1.
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Suppose that there exists s = 0, . . . , N − 1 such that G(s) < 0. Since G(−1) = 0, there






































i=1 λi(zi,s+1) = 0, then G(s) =
g
µs+1
≥ 0, which is impossible. Therefore, G(s + 1) <
G(s) < 0. Since µs+2 ≥ µs+1, µs+2G(s+1)−µs+1G(s) < 0, so we can repeat the argument
above until we reach state N − 1, for which G(N − 1) < 0. But G(N − 1) = g
µN
≥ 0, which
yields a contradiction. Therefore, for all s = −1, . . . , N − 1, 0 ≤ G(s) ≤ g
µs+1
.
We now show that (2) holds. Now suppose that there exists s = 0, . . . , N − 1 such
that zi,s = βi for all i = 1, . . . , N − 1. This implies that G(s) ≥ maxi βi. Therefore,




≥ G(s) ≥ maxi βi. Hence, zi,s−1 = βi for all i = 0, . . . , I. By
induction, we have G(−1) = g
µ0
, exhibiting a contradiction. 2
As opposed the holding cost model, the second property in Lemma 4.2.4 implies that it
never optimal to set zi,s = βi for all i in some state s. In other words, it is suboptimal for
the service provider to refuse entry to all customers in some state s ≤ N − 1.
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Using our solution characterization in Theorem 4.2.2, we are now able to derive struc-
tural and ordering properties of the optimal pricing solution and reward. In the next
proposition, we demonstrate that the optimal prices to be charged are nondecreasing in the
state index, under mild assumptions on ps and µs.




s=0 are such that there exists an integer q
between 0 and N , where µ0 ≤ µ1 ≤ . . . ≤ µq = µq+1 = . . . = µN and 1 = p0 = p1 = . . . =
pq−1 ≥ pq ≥ . . . ≥ pN−1. Then, G(s) and z
∗
i,s are nondecreasing in s.
Proof We split our proof into two parts. First, we prove by induction that G(s− 1) ≤ G(s)
for s = 0, . . . , q − 1. Then, we show that G(s − 1) ≤ G(s) holds for s = q, . . . , N − 1 using
an induction as well.
Suppose G(s − 1) ≤ G(s) for some state s = 0, . . . , q − 2. It clearly holds for s = 0.




sup{λi(z)(z − G(s + 1))} = g
∗
N − µs+1G(s)



















i,s) > 0. Hence, G(s + 1) ≥ G(s). By induction, G(s − 1) ≤ G(s)
holds for s = 0, . . . , q − 1.
If q = N , the proof is complete. Otherwise, it remains to show by induction that
G(s − 1) ≤ G(s) for states s = q, . . . , N − 1. Now suppose that G(s) ≥ G(s − 1) for
some state s = q + 1, . . . , N − 1. The first result of Lemma 4.2.4 shows that it holds when
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s = N − 1. We have,









sup{λi(z)(z − G(s − 1))}
≤ g∗N − µNG(s − 2).
Hence, µN (G(s − 1) − G(s − 2)) ≥ 0. By induction, G(s) ≥ G(s − 1) for s = q, . . . , N − 1
and the proof is complete. 2
As in the holding cost model, Proposition 4.2.5 shows that the optimal prices act as an
indirect congestion control, deterring customers from entering congested states. The service
provide must charge more in congested states in order to offset to future loss of potential
customers deterred by the queue length. Let us analyze now how the optimal prices and
reward change with respect to an increase in the system capacity N . Intuitively, the optimal
reward g∗N should increase as N grows. We demonstrate this in the next proposition. The
proof of the following result is a minor change from the proof of Proposition 4.2.2 and can
be found in the Appendix. Recall that we use the additional subscripts 1 and 2 when we
compare two systems indexed by 1 and 2 respectively.
Proposition 4.2.6 Consider two systems 1 and 2, where system 1 has capacity N and
system 2 has capacity N + 1. Then, g∗N+1 ≥ g
∗




i,s,1 for s = 0, . . . , N − 1
and i = 1, . . . , I.
In Section 3.3, we exhibited a unique optimal static price that maximizes the long-run
average reward in the case of a unique customer class in a single server system. In the next
Proposition, we compare this optimal static price with the optimal dynamic policy derived
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in Theorem 4.2.2 in the case of a unique customer class (I = 1) in a single server system
(µs = µ for all s = 1, . . . , N).
Proposition 4.2.7 Let I = 1 and consider a single server system of capacity N . Let y∗N





Proof Since I = 1, we omit the customer class subscript in this proof. Consider a sin-
gle server system with service rate µ. Recall from Theorem 3.3.1 that y∗N = inf{y :
yr(y)γbN (ρ(y)) ≥ 1}, where ρ(y) =
λ(y)
µ
. First, we show that y∗N ≤ z
∗
1,N−1. From The-




We will show that for all y ≥ 0 such that r(y)(y −
g∗N
µ
) ≥ 1, we have r(y)γbN (ρ(y)) ≥ 1.
Consider y ≥ 0 such that r(y)(y −
g∗N
µ





≤ π0(ρ(y), N)y ≤ γ
b
N (ρ(y))y.





We now prove that z∗0 ≤ y
∗




0 = sup{y :









g∗Nr(y) ≤ λ(y) and r(y)γ
b
N (ρ(y))y > 1. From Lemma A.0.5, we have





n ≤ g∗N .
Therefore, g∗Nr(y) ≥ λ(y)r(y)γ
b




As in the model with holding cost, in single server queues with a unique customer class,
the optimal static price lies in between the optimal dynamic prices to be charged in extremal
states.
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4.2.3 Systems with Impatient Customers
In this section, we model congestion penalties through impatient customers. The customer
impatient behavior is the same as described in Section 3.4. Payments are collected upon
arrival. Each customer entering the system has a random maximum waiting time distributed
as an exponential random variable with parameter θ. The maximum waiting times of
successive customers are assumed to be independent of each other, of the arrival process,
of the service time process and of the customers’ willingness-to-pay. If a customer does not
begin service prior to his maximum waiting time, the customer reneges and receives a full
refund from the service provider. We assume that the system has q identical servers with
rate µ; that is, µs = (s ∧ q)µ. Only customers who are waiting for service are impatient.
Therefore, we assume that N > q without loss of generality.
As opposed to the static pricing scheme used in Section 3.4, the refunds received by
impatient customers can now vary from one customer to another. Therefore, it seems that
we need to include the prices paid by customers currently in the system in the system state
description. In other words, defining the state of the system as the number of customers
seems to be insufficient to use a Markovian analysis. We show that it is not the case when
the queueing discipline is First-In First-Out (FIFO).
4.2.3.1 FIFO Queueing Discipline
Let ws, s = 0, . . . , N −1 denote the probability that a customer entering a system in state s
will not renege and will leave upon service completion. In the remainder of this section, we
assume that the system operates under a FIFO queueing discipline. Consequently, it is clear
that ws does not depend on the arrival process. We compute ws in the next proposition.
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Proposition 4.2.8 Consider a system with impatient customers and q servers under FIFO




Proof If s < q, then ws = 1. Otherwise, we can compute ws the following way: ws =
P (Xs ≥
∑s
n=q Yn) where Xs ∼ Expo(θ) and Yn ∼ Expo((n − q)θ + µq). The random
variable Xs represents the patience time of the customer of interest. The random variables
Yq, . . . , Ys represent the interdeparture times of the customers waiting in line in front of the
customer of interest. We have :






































(n − q)θ + µq
(n − q + 1)θ + µq
ws =
µq
(s − q)θ + µq
2
As earlier, we use a Markov decision process formulation. However, we use the expected
reward generated by a customer admission in state s instead of the actual reward. Under
pricing policy z, the expected reward generated by a class-i customer entering the system
in state s is zi,sws. Since ws does not depend on the pricing policy and only depends on
the current state s, using expected rewards spares us from keeping track of the prices paid
by impatient customers (see p.20 in Puterman [18]).
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We have the following system of ACOE:
G(−1) = 0, (9)
g − (µs + (s − q)






{λi(z)(wsz − G(s))}, if s = 0, . . . , N − 1, (10)
G(N − 1) =
g
µN + (N − q)θ
. (11)
In the next theorem and lemma, we show the existence a canonical triplet (g, G(·), z) to
(9)-(11) that corresponds to an optimal dynamic pricing solution. We also characterize the
optimal prices to be charged.
Theorem 4.2.3 There exists a canonical triplet (g, G(·), z) for the ACOE system (9)-(11).
Moreover, the optimal long-run average reward is g∗N = g and z
∗ = z is a unique optimal












Since the state space is finite, the proof of Theorem 4.2.3 is similar to the proof of
Theorem 4.2.1 and is omitted. The following lemma states useful properties of canonical
triplets to (9)-(11).
Lemma 4.2.5 Let (g, G(·), z) be a canonical triplet for the ACOE system (9)-(11). Then,
1. for all s = −1, . . . , N − 1, 0 ≤ G(s) ≤ g
µs+1+(s−q+1)+θ
.
2. for all s = 0, . . . , N − 1, there exists i = 1, . . . , I such that zi,s < βi.
Proof Let (g, G(·), z) be a canonical triplet for the ACOE system (9)-(11). First, we show
that (1) holds. Equations (10) and (11), immediately imply that G(s) ≤ g
µs+1+(s−q+1)+θ
for
s = 0, . . . , N −1. Suppose that G(s) < 0 for some s = 0, . . . , N −1. Since G(−1) = 0, there
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exists s ≥ 0 such that G(s) < 0 and G(s− 1) ≥ 0. Therefore, (µs+1 + (s− q + 1)
+θ)G(s)−
(µs + (s − q)







































i=1 λi(zi,s+1) = 0, then G(s) =
g
µs+1
≥ 0, which is impossible. Hence, G(s + 1) <
G(s) < 0. Since (µs+2 + (s + 2 − q)
+θ) ≥ (µs+1 + (s + 1 − q)
+θ), (µs+2 + (s + 2 −
q)+θ)G(s + 1) − (µs+1 + (s + 1 − q)
+θ)G(s) < 0, this argument can be repeated until we
reach G(N − 1) < 0. But G(N − 1) = g
µN+(N−q)+θ
≥ 0, which yields a contradiction.
Therefore, for all s = −1, . . . , N − 1, 0 ≤ G(s) ≤ g
µs+1+(s+1−q)+θ
.
We now show that (2) holds. Now suppose that there exists s = 0, . . . , N − 1 such
that zi,s = βi for all i = 1, . . . , N − 1. This implies that G(s) ≥ maxi βi. Therefore,




≥ G(s) ≥ maxi βi. Hence, zi,s−1 = βi for all
i = 0, . . . , I. By induction, we have G(−1) = g
µ0
= 0, yielding a contradiction. 2
We now focus on deriving structural and ordering properties of the optimal solution and
reward. Similarly to the models with holding costs or balking customers, we show in the
next proposition that the optimal prices to be charged are nondecreasing in the state index.
Proposition 4.2.9 The sequences G(s)
ws
and z∗i,s are nondecreasing in s.
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Proof First, we show that G(s)
ws










this implies that z∗i,s is nondecreasing in s.
We split our proof into two parts. First, we prove by induction that G(s−1) ≤ G(s) for
s = 0, . . . , q − 1 since ws = 1 for s < q. This part of the proof is identical to the beginning










for some state s = q+1, . . . , N −1. The first part of Lemma
4.2.5 shows that it holds when s = N − 1. Then,

































sup{λi(z)(ws−1z − G(s − 1))}
≤ g∗N − (µN + (s − q − 1)θ)G(s − 2).










for s = q, . . . , N − 1 and the proof is complete. 2
In the next proposition, we investigate how the optimal prices and rewards change with
an increase in capacity N . On the one hand, in systems of larger capacity, fewer customers
are turned downed due to capacity limitations. On the other hand, the customers’ waiting
time and their likelihood of reneging are higher as N gets larger. We show that the optimal
reward is nondecreasing in N and that the price to be charged to class-i customers in state
s is nonincreasing in N . The proof of the next proposition given in the Appendix.
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Proposition 4.2.10 Consider two systems 1 and 2, where system 1 has capacity N and
system 2 has capacity N + 1. Then, g∗N+1 ≥ g
∗




i,s,1 for s = 0, . . . , N − 1
and i = 1, . . . , I.
In Section 3.4, we characterized a unique static optimal price y∗N to be charged in the case
of a single server M/M/1 queue with a unique customer class. In the following proposition,
we investigate how the optimal dynamic prices derived in Theorem 4.2.3 compare with y∗N ,
when there is a unique customer class (I = 1) in a single server queue (µs = µ for all
s = 1, . . . , N).
Proposition 4.2.11 Let I = 1 and consider a single server system of capacity N . Let y∗N





Proof As I = 1, we omit the class subscript in the remainder of this proof. From Theorem
3.4.1, we have y∗N = inf{y : yr(y)γ
r
N (ρ(y)) ≥ 1}, where ρ(y) =
λ(y)
µ
. First, we show that
y∗N ≤ z
∗






















We prove that for all y ≥ 0 such that r(y)(y −
g∗N
µ
) ≥ 1, we have r(y)γrN (ρ(y)) ≥ 1.
Consider y ≥ 0 such that r(y)(y −
g∗N
µ
) ≥ 1. Since dynamic pricing performs better than




≤ π0(ρ(y), N)y ≤ γ
r
N (ρ(y))y.





We now show that z∗0 ≤ y
∗




0 = sup{y :










that g∗Nr(y) ≤ λ(y) and r(y)γ
r
N (ρ(y))y > 1. From Lemma A.0.5, we have























=µy(1 − π0(ρ(y), N)) ≤ g
∗
N .
Consequently, g∗Nr(y) ≥ λ(y)r(y)γ
r
N (ρ(y))y > λ(y) and we reach a contradiction. We
conclude that z∗0 ≤ y
∗
N . 2
4.2.3.2 FIFO vs. LIFO
Under static pricing and with a unique customer class, it is clear that the optimal prices and
reward do not depend on the queueing discipline. In this case, all customers pay the same
price and can be considered as identical once in the system. However, we assumed that the
service provider enforces a FIFO queueing discipline when analyzing the impatient customer
model under dynamic precision pricing. In this section, we investigate how changing the
queueing discipline to a preemptive Last-In First-Out (LIFO) discipline affects the optimal
reward.
In the following, we assume that we only have one customer class (I = 1). Let RLIFO(z)
denote the long-run average reward for the system under pricing policy z and preemptive
LIFO queueing discipline. In the next theorem, we demonstrate that, a system under
LIFO performs better than a system under FIFO provided that the advertised prices are
nondecreasing in the state index.
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Theorem 4.2.4 If I = 1, then for any stationary pricing policy z such that zs is nonde-
creasing in s, we have R(z) ≤ RLIFO(z).
To prove this theorem, we need the following proposition and lemma.
Proposition 4.2.12 Suppose that I = 1 and consider any queueing discipline and station-
ary pricing policy z such that z1,s is nondecreasing in s. Then, for all s = 0, . . . N −1, when
s+1 customers are in the system, the customer who was admitted into the system last paid
at least z1,s.
Proof If s + 1 is the current number of customers in the system, the last customer to enter
the system encountered at least s customers in the system upon arrival. Therefore, the
customer question paid at least z1,s. 2
Lemma 4.2.6 Consider a system with a single customer class (I = 1), under FIFO dis-
































Lemma 4.2.6 shows that, under the FIFO queueing discipline, the system performs as
if any exiting customer leaving s customers behind had paid price z1,s upon admission. We
use this property to prove Theorem 4.2.4.
Proof of Theorem 4.2.4 Consider a system under preemptive LIFO queueing discipline.
From Lemma 4.2.12, we can claim that any customer being serviced and leaving the system
with s customers behind must have paid at least z1,s upon arrival. Therefore, we use Lemma







A direct consequence of Theorem 4.2.4 is that a service provider using the optimal policy
z∗ as defined in Theorem 4.2.3 can improve profits by enforcing a LIFO queueing discipline.
However, implementing LIFO incurs some hidden costs that are not captured in our model.
Namely, under LIFO, customers who have been in the system for a long time may witness
other customers with shorter waiting time being processed before them. There is a loss of
customer goodwill that is associated with the customers’ discontent. Therefore, the benefits
from using a LIFO queueing policy might be offset by this hidden cost.
4.3 Queueing Systems with Infinite Capacity
In this section, we impose no limitation on the system capacity. This introduces some
difficulties since the ACOE system now has infinitely many equations and solution triplets.
Moreover, unlike in the finite capacity case, a canonical triplet does not always translate
into an optimal stationary policy. Nevertheless, under certain parameter structures, we are
able to find an optimal stationary policy that maximizes the long-term average profit per
unit time.
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4.3.1 Uniform Asymptotic Parameter Structure
First, we consider a particular parameter structure in the model with holding costs and the
model with balking customers.
Definition 4.3.1 The service system is said to have Uniform Asymptotic Parameter Struc-
ture (UAPS) if its parameters satisfy
• in the model with holding costs: there exists N < ∞, such that hs = hN , µs = µN for
s ≥ N and
∑I
i=1 Λi < µN ,
• in the model with balking customers: there exists N < ∞, such that ps = pN , µs = µN
for s ≥ N and pN
∑I
i=1 Λi < µN .
Note that we do not have a UAPS in the model with impatient customers. Since each
customer in the queue is impatient, the reneging rate cannot be constant past a certain
state.
In order to show the existence of an optimal stationary policy, we use the mappings Ψh
and Ψb defined as
Ψh : R × R+ → R
(V, g) 7→
g + hN −
∑I
i=1 sup{λi(z)(z − V )}
µN




i=1 sup{λi(z)(z − V )}
µN
.
We show in Lemma B.0.7 that for all g ≥ 0, Ψh(·, g) and Ψb(·, g) are nondecreasing
and each have a unique fixed point. This fixed point is denoted by FP h(g) and FP b(g) for
Ψh(·, g) and Ψb(·, g) respectively.
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Instead of having all of the infinitely many equations of the ACOE system, we only
consider a finite subset corresponding to states s = 0, . . . , N −1. We use the functions FP h
and FP b to define G(s) for states s ≥ N − 1. Thus, we analyze the following systems of
optimality equations.
• In the model with holding costs:
G(−1) = 0, (12)






{(z − G(s))λi(z)} if s = 0, . . . , N − 1, (13)
G(s) = FP h(g) if s = N − 1, . . . ,∞. (14)
• In the model with balking customers:
G(−1) = 0, (15)






{(z − G(s))λi(z)} if s = 0, . . . , N − 1, (16)
G(s) = FP b(g) if s = N − 1, . . . ,∞. (17)
Note that if there exists a canonical triplet satisfying (12)-(14) or (15)-(17), it also
satisfies the full system of optimality equations from the corresponding congestion penalty
model. In the next theorem, we demonstrate that there exists canonical triplets to (12)-(14)
and (15)-(17). Moreover, we prove the existence of an optimal stationary policy that we
characterize in each UAPS model.
Theorem 4.3.1 The following statements hold:
1. There exists a canonical triplet to the ACOE (12)-(14) and (15)-(17) respectively.
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2. Let (g, G(·), z) is a canonical triplet to (12)-(14). Then, z∗ = z and g∗∞ = g in the
UAPS model with holding costs. Moreover, z∗i,s = inf{z : ri(z)(z − G(s)) ≥ 1} for all
s = 0, . . . ,∞ and i = 1, . . . , I.
3. Let (g, G(·), z) is a canonical triplet to (15)-(17). Then, z∗ = z and g∗∞ = g in the
UAPS model with balking customers. Moreover, z∗i,s = inf{z : ri(z)(z − G(s)) ≥ 1}
for all s = 0, . . . ,∞ and i = 1, . . . , I.
Proof
1. First, we show that there exists a canonical triplet to (12)-(14). We only need to show
the existence a canonical triplet to (12), (13) and G(N − 1) = FP h(g). Then, by
extending G(·) and z to G(s) = G(N − 1) = FP h(g) and zi,s = zi,N−1 for s ≥ N − 1,
(g, G(·), z) is also a solution of the full system of ACOE (12)-(14).










and consequently FP h(
∑I
i=1 sup{λi(z)z}) ≥ 0. Therefore, the proof is exactly the
same as in Lemma 4.2.1 except that G(N − 1, g) = FP h(g) is now the starting point
of the induction. In same fashion, we show the existence of a canonical triplet to
(15)-(17).
2. Let (g, G(·), z) is a canonical triplet to (12)-(14). We now prove that it corresponds
to an optimal solution in the UAPS model with holding costs. According to equation









where ΠRH is the set of all history-dependent randomized policies and s0 is the starting
state at time t = 0. If it is the case, the canonical triplet corresponds to an optimal
stationary policy. Recall that l(s) − l(s + 1) = G(s) for all s = 0, . . . ,∞. Therefore,




[l(X(t))|X(t) < N ]P (X(t) < N)
+
(
l(N) − (Eds0 [X(t)|X(t) ≥ N ] − N)FP
h(g)
)
P (X(t) ≥ N).





































Eds0 [X(t)|X(t) ≥ N ]P (X(t) ≥ N) ≤ sup
d∈ΠRH
Eds0 [X(t)]
and that the supremum supd∈ΠRH E
d
s0
[X(t)] is attained for policy ẑ, where ẑ denotes
the stationary policy of charging price 0 to all customers in all states (ẑi,s = 0 for





Eds0 [X(t)] ≤ limt→∞









and we can apply Theorem 5.2.4 from Lasserre and Hernández-Lerma [11] and claim
that z = z∗ and g = g∗∞.
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3. In the UAPS model with balking customers, the proof is identical to part 2 using
FP b(g) in lieu of FP h(g) and is omitted.
2
This theorem enables us to explicitly characterize an optimal stationary policy in sys-
tems under UAPS. Note that the service provider charges the same price z∗i,N−1 to class-i
customers for all states s ≥ N − 1. This property is quite surprising since there is no
apparent symmetry in the transition structure to justify it.
4.3.2 General Parameters: Systems with Holding Costs
Under Uniform Asymptotic Parameter Structure, we are able to explicitly derive an optimal
stationary pricing policy. The assumption that µs = µN for s ≥ N for some N is often
encountered as servers become saturated with congestion. However, a linear holding cost
structure does not allow us to use a UAPS. Neither do systems with impatient customers.
In this section, we analyze infinite capacity systems with more general parameter structures.
We assume that the service system has q identical servers such that µs = µ(s∧q). First,







}. We assume that h0 = h1 = . . . = hq = 0 and
h1
µ1
< max βi in order
to have an attainable positive reward. We also suppose that
∑I
i=1 Λi < µq so that the
system is stable under any pricing policy.
First, let us consider willingness-to-pay distributions with finite support (βi < ∞ for
all i = 1, . . . , I). In this case, we demonstrate in the next proposition that we can actually
restrict our analysis to finite capacity systems; that is, it is optimal not to admit customers
in the system past a certain finite congestion level.




M , where M = max{s :
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hs < µs max βi}.
Proof To prove this proposition, we show that for any stationary policy of the infinite
capacity system, one can find a stationary policy of the truncated M -capacity system that
performs as well. Let z be a stationary pricing policy for the infinite capacity system such




of a positive reward. Now consider the M -capacity stationary pricing policy z|M, which is
defined as the truncation of z up to state M − 1 included. More precisely, z
|M
i,s = zi,s for all










































). Clearly, the definition of M implies that as ≤ 0 for















































































and R(z|M) ≥ R(z), proving the result. 2
Proposition 4.3.1 shows that if all the willingness-to-pay distributions F1, . . . , FI have
finite support, we can restrict our analysis to finite capacity queues and refer to Section 4.2.1.
Therefore, without loss of generality, we now assume that at least one of the willingness-
to-pay distributions F1, . . . , FI has infinite support in the rest of this section. To prove the
existence of an optimal stationary policy, we approximate the infinite capacity system by
a finite capacity model of large size. We validate this approximation through two limiting
results in Proposition 4.3.2 and Theorem 4.3.2. Note that Weber and Stidham [20] provide








∞ as N goes to infinity.
Theorem 4.3.2 Let (g∗N , G(·), z
N ) be the canonical triplet associated with the truncated
system of capacity N . Then, under the stability condition
∑I
i=1 Λi < µq, there exists z,
such that zNi,s ↓ zi,s ∀i, s as N → ∞. Moreover, z = z
∗ is optimal for the infinite capacity
model.
We need the following lemma to prove Proposition 4.3.2 and Theorem 4.3.2.
Lemma 4.3.1 Let z be a stationary pricing policy and z|N be the truncation of z up to state
N − 1. Under the stability condition
∑I
i=1 Λi < µq, R(z

















i λi(zi,0) . . .
∑
i λi(zi,s−1)





























i λi(zi,0) . . .
∑
i λi(zi,s−1)




















, as N goes to infinity, π0(z
|N) → π0(z).
Therefore, R(z|N) → R(z) , which proves the desired result. 2
Proof of Proposition 4.3.2 We will prove this proposition by contradiction. From Propo-
sition 4.2.2, we know that g∗N is nondecreasing in N and that limN g
∗
N exists and is less




∞. Then, according to Lemma 4.3.1,
there exists an N -capacity stationary policy zN , such that limN g
∗
N < R(z
N ) < g∗∞. As
R(zN ) ≤ g∗N , we have a contradiction and the proof is complete. 2
Proof of Theorem 4.3.2 We proved in Proposition 4.3.2 that g∗N converges to g
∗
∞. Since
we assumed that at least one of the willingness-to-pay distributions F1, . . . , FI has infinite
support, we use Proposition 4.2.2 to claim that zNi,s is a nonincreasing sequence in N .
Therefore, limN z
N
i,s = zi,s exists.




∞, it must imply that R(z) = g
∗
∞
and that z is optimal.
To do so, we will prove first that for any s, πs(z
N ) → πs(z) as N goes to infinity. Since
πs(z










µ1 . . . µs
, (18)
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we only need to prove that π0(z
N ) → π0(z). We have
π0(z



















i λi(zi,0) . . .
∑
i λi(zi,s−1)
µ1 . . . µs
.
(19)
Let M be an arbitrary integer smaller than N ,
π0(z













µ1 . . . µs
−
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i λi(zi,0) . . .
∑
i λi(zi,s−1)




















i λi(zi,0) . . .
∑
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µ1 . . . µs
−
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i λi(zi,0) . . .
∑
i λi(zi,s−1)














µ1 . . . µs
. (21)
First, let N go to infinity and then let M go to infinity. We have πs(z
N ) → πs(z) for all
s ≥ 0 as N goes to infinity.
Now consider



































































µ1 . . . µs
.
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Letting N go to ∞ yields
lim
N→∞




















µ1 . . . µs
,
and letting M go to ∞ implies that limN g
∗
N = R(z). Therefore, z = z
∗ is an optimal
stationary policy and the proof is complete. 2
The key element of this result is that the stationary probability of being in highly
congested states is negligible under any stationary policy. Thus, an infinite capacity system
can be approximated by a system of large finite capacity. The optimal stationary policy
exists and is the limit of finite-capacity optimal policies, which enables us to state the
following proposition.
Proposition 4.3.3 Under the stability condition
∑I
i=1 Λi < µq, z
∗
i,s is nondecreasing in s.




i,s is the optimal price at
state s for the truncated N -capacity system. By Proposition 4.2.1, zNi,s is nondecreasing in
s. Hence, the same holds for z∗i,s. 2
Although we do not characterize the optimal stationary policy explicitly in this case,
we can still derive some insights. Not surprisingly, the structures of the infinite and finite
capacity optimal policies are the same. High prices are charged in congested states in order
to minimize holding costs.
4.3.3 General Parameters: Systems with Balking Customers and Systems with
Impatient Customers
In this section, we study systems with balking customers and systems with impatient cus-
tomers when N = ∞ in cases when UAPS does not necessarily apply. We still assume that
the service system has q identical servers such that µs = µ(s∧q). Similarly to the case with
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holding costs, we approximate systems of infinite capacity by systems of large finite capacity.
We show the existence of an optimal pricing policy for both congestion models under a sta-
bility condition. In systems with balking customers, we assume that lims ps
∑I
i=1 Λi < µq
so that the system is stable under any stationary pricing policy. Moreover, we suppose
that 1 = p0 = p1 = . . . = pq−1 ≥ pq ≥ . . . ≥ pN−1. In systems with impatient customers,
we assume that a FIFO queueing discipline is enforced. Stability follows directly from the
departures of impatient customers. As opposed the previous section, we need not consider
separately willingness-to-pay distributions that have finite or infinite support (see Lemmas
4.2.4 and 4.2.5). In the following theorem, we show the existence of an optimal pricing solu-
tion in systems with balking customers and in systems with impatient customers. Similarly
to Theorem 4.3.2, we use systems of large finite capacity to approximate infinite capacity
systems.
Theorem 4.3.3 The following holds for systems with balking customers if lims ps
∑I
i=1 Λi <
µq and for systems with impatient customers. Let (g∗N , G(·), z
N ) be the canonical triplet as-
sociated with the truncated system of capacity N . Then, g∗N ↑ g
∗
∞ and there exists z, such
that zNi,s ↓ zi,s ∀i, s as N → ∞. Moreover, z = z
∗ is optimal for the infinite capacity model.
Proof In systems with balking customers, the proof follows the same path as the proofs
of Proposition 4.3.2, Lemma 4.3.1 and Theorem 4.3.2 by setting hs = 0 and substi-












Consider now the case of impatient customers. We follow the same framework as in
Proposition 4.3.2 and Theorem 4.3.2 using the long-run optimal rewards for stationary
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i λi(zi,0) . . .
∑
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i λi(zi,0) . . .
∑
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i λi(zi,0) . . .
∑
i λi(zi,s−1)








i λi(zi,0) . . .
∑
i λi(zi,s−1)
(µ1 + (1 − q)+θ) . . . (µs + (s − q)+θ)
.
It is straightforward to show that R(z|N) → R(z) as N goes to infinity as in Lemma 4.3.1,
implying that g∗N ↑ g
∗
∞ as in Proposition 4.3.2.
Let (g∗N , G(·), z
N ) be the canonical triplet associated with the truncated system of ca-
pacity N . From Proposition 4.2.10, zNi,s is nonincreasing in N for all i = 1, . . . , I and s < N ,
therefore it has a limit zi,s corresponding to a stationary pricing policy z. As in Theorem
4.3.2, we now show that g∗N → R(z), which implies that R(z) = g
∗
∞ and that z is an optimal
pricing solution for the infinite capacity model.
We need to show first that for any s, πs(z
N ) → πs(z) as N goes to infinity. This is easily
verified using equations (18) to (21) and substituting (µ1 + (1 − q)
+θ) . . . (µs + (s − q)
+θ)
for µ1 . . . µs.
We have




















So, for an arbitrary integer M smaller than N ,



























(µ1 + (1 − q)+θ) . . . (µs + (s − q)+θ)
.
81
Letting N go to infinity yields
lim
N→∞










(µ1 + (1 − q)+θ) . . . (µs + (s − q)+θ)
.
Letting M go to infinity implies that g∗N → R(z) and the proof is complete. 2
A direct consequence of Theorem 4.3.3 is that z∗i,s, i = 1, . . . , I is nondecreasing in s in
the model with balking customers as well as in the model with impatient customers. The
congestion control performed by optimal prices in finite capacity systems extends to models
with infinite capacity.
4.4 Summary
In this chapter, we allowed the service provider to adjust prices. We relaxed the model
described in Chapter 3 by having multiple customer classes to whom the service provider
can advertise specific prices. Our objective was to exhibit optimal dynamic pricing policies
that maximize the long-run average reward in each of the three congestion models considered
separately.
First, we focused on queues with finite capacity. For each congestion model, we char-
acterized a unique optimal stationary policy using a Markov decision process formulation.
In systems with impatient customers, we made the extra assumption of a FIFO queueing
discipline to analyze the model without keeping track of payment history. With mild as-
sumptions on the parameters’ structure, we showed that the optimal prices to be charged
are nondecreasing in the state index for each congestion model. Therefore, the service
provider indirectly controls congestion penalties by deterring customers to enter congested
states. Comparing our results with those of Chapter 3, we also demonstrated that, in each
congestion model with a unique customer class, the optimal static price lies in between
the optimal dynamic prices to be charged in extremal states. Moreover, in systems with
82
impatient customers, we investigated the impact of a queueing policy change on the optimal
reward and showed that implementing a LIFO queueing policy improves the performance
of the system.
Second, we considered systems with infinite capacity. We characterized an optimal
stationary policy for systems with holding costs and systems with balking customers under
Uniform Asymptotic Parameter Structure. Recall that UAPS describes systems whose
parameters are the same for all states s ≥ N for some finite index N . In this case, we
showed that the optimal solution has the same prices being charged to class-i customers
across all states s ≥ N − 1. In instances where UAPS does not necessarily hold, we showed
the existence of an optimal dynamic solution by approximating systems of infinite capacity
by systems of large finite capacity. For each of the three congestion models, we demonstrated
that both the optimal prices and rewards of a finite capacity system converge to those of
an infinite capacity system.
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CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AND FUTURE RESEARCH
In this section, we summarize the main contributions of this dissertation and provide sug-
gestions for future research.
5.1 Main Results
We analyzed the problem of optimal pricing in queueing systems where congestion plays
a key role. We modelled congestion penalties in three different ways and analyzed both
static pricing and dynamic pricing schemes in each case. We chose to analyze the three
congestion penalties separately to isolate their respective effects on optimal rewards and
pricing policies. Most of the literature in the area of pricing in queueing system only
considers a single pricing scheme and a unique way of capturing congestion penalties (most
often through holding costs) and does not provide a comprehensive study of how congestion
affects profit. Moreover, the issue of optimal pricing in systems with balking customers and
in systems with impatient customers with refund has received little attention. The same
can be claimed about the comparison of optimal dynamic prices with static prices. We also
noticed that much of literature imposes strong restrictions on the system parameters and
the action space when analyzing dynamic pricing in infinite capacity queues.
The main result of our work is the determination of an optimal static price as well
as an optimal stationary policy in each of the three congestion models. In each case, we
compared the optimal static price with optimal dynamic prices. Although much of the lit-
erature considers the system capacity as a given parameter, we investigated its relationship
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with optimal prices and rewards. For instance, we showed that, under static pricing, the
service provider should restrict the system capacity when holding costs are incurred. In
systems with balking customers and in systems with impatient customers, capacity should
be unrestricted to maximize profit.
In systems with impatient customers under dynamic pricing, we showed that we need
not keep track of payment history to determine an optimal stationary policy when a FIFO
queueing discipline is enforced. This enabled us to keep a Markovian formulation with the
system state describing the number of customers in the facility.
Another important contribution of our work is the analysis of dynamic pricing in infinite
capacity queues. With mild assumptions on the action space, we demonstrated that the
optimal dynamic prices and rewards of finite capacity systems converge to those of an
infinite capacity system in each of the three congestion models. In cases with specific
parameter structures, we explicitly characterized an optimal stationary policy when capacity
is unlimited.
5.2 Future Research
In the following, we suggest some uninvestigated research topics related to our work.
5.2.1 Optimal Pricing in Systems with Multiple Congestion Penalties and Pri-
orities
In this dissertation, we chose to analyze the three types of congestion penalties separately to
isolate and compare the features and effects of each model. However, some service systems
can very well experience a mix of congestion penalties in practice. For instance, combin-
ing impatient and balking customers is quite natural. Indeed, balking customers can be
considered as “smart” impatient customers who are able to forecast their waiting time and
might leave before even entering the system. Under dynamic pricing, it is straightforward to
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combine any of the three models discussed in Chapter 4 of this dissertation. Nevertheless,
the determination of optimal static prices with multiple types of penalties is more intricate.
It is unclear whether the long-run average reward under static pricing is strictly unimodal
when combining congestion penalties.
The other interesting feature of combining congestion penalties is the use of priorities.
Consider a system where arriving customers can be impatient or not. A natural priority
scheme would be to serve impatient customers first in order to minimize their waiting time
and consequently curb the refunds paid to those who renege. The service provider may have
the option to advertise different prices to customers that are impatient or not. Intuitively,
impatient customers must be charged higher prices. We need a two-dimensional state space
to describe the state of such a system as
X(t) = (number of impatient customers at time t, total number of customers at time t).
The priority system and the transition structure disrupt the birth-death properties we have
in this dissertation. Therefore, the determination of optimal dynamic pricing solutions
requires the use of a policy iteration or value iteration method. One might also consider an
asymptotic regime such as a fluid or diffusion approximation to investigate such a system
where priorities significantly complicate the exact analysis.
5.2.2 Optimal Pricing with Adjustable Service Rate in Systems with Balking
Customers and Systems with Impatient Customers
In our research, we considered service rates as given unadjustable parameters. By doing
so, we assumed that service capacity was a sunk cost and that no action could be taken to
expand or reduce the service offering. However, in some telecommunication service systems,
the service rate could be dynamically adjusted. This is the case in wireless transmission
applications where the power needed to transmit data packets can be tuned. There is a
86
clear tradeoff as lower transmission power consumes less energy but degrades the quality
of service. Ata and Shneorson [2] investigate this issue and consider the dynamic pricing
problem of maximizing the long-run average reward in M/M/1 queues with adjustable
service rates. However, they only consider holding costs as a way to capture congestion
penalties.
We can extend this model to systems with balking customers and systems with impatient
customers. The model with impatient customers is particularly relevant in transmission
networks with timeouts. If a data packet is not transmitted within a specific amount of
time, the connection is dropped in the same fashion as an impatient customer would renege.
Let c(µ) denote the cost per unit time associated with offering service rate µ. We assume
that c(·) is a continuous nondecreasing function and that c(0) = 0. Then, we can express








{λi(z)(z − G(s))} + sup
µ>0
{µG(s − 1) − c(µ)}, if s = 0, . . . , N − 1,
g = sup
µ>0
{µG(N − 1) − c(µ)}.
The analysis of systems with impatient customers is more complex. In Section 4.2.3,
we assumed that a FIFO queueing discipline was enforced. This implied that ws, s =
0, . . . , N −1 did not depend on the pricing policy (recall that ws denotes the the probability
that a customer entering a system in state s will not renege and will leave upon service
completion). But ws clearly depends on the service rate, which is a decision variable now.
Therefore, the Markov decision process formulation we used in Section 4.2.3 no longer
holds as the reward obtained in state s now depends on the service rates set for other
states. Under a monotonicity assumption for the service rate policy, it may be possible to
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bound the optimal reward. Otherwise, the analysis of this problem might require the use
of an asymptotic regime approximation.
5.2.3 Optimal Pricing with Multiple Service Requirements
In this dissertation, we assumed that the customers from all classes require one unit of
service; that is, every customer occupies exactly one slot in the system. Paschalidis and
Tsitsiklis [17] investigate the case where the customers’ service requirements vary from one
class to the other and the service provider may advertise class-specific prices. They deter-
mine optimal static prices as well as an optimal stationary policy (class-specific congestion-
dependent prices) that maximize the long-run average reward. They also demonstrate that
the optimal dynamic reward can be approximately matched by suitably chosen static prices.
However, they do not consider any congestion penalty in their model. Hence, they do not
capture customers’ aversion to congestion or the loss of goodwill incurred by keeping cus-
tomers in the system.
We can extend the three congestion models discussed in this dissertation by considering
the dynamic precision pricing problem with class-specific service requirements. This would
enable us to further distinguish customer classes through their required service times. The
birth-death structure no longer holds in this case and the MDP analysis would require a
policy or value iteration method. As opposed to Paschalidis and Tsitsiklis [17], it is not
likely that static pricing would closely match the performance of dynamic pricing when
congestion penalties are incurred. Since higher penalties are incurred in congested states, it
is intuitive that an optimal congestion-dependent pricing policy significantly improves profit
compared to an optimal static pricing policy. For instance, as we demonstrated in Section
4.2.1, there are instances where holding costs make some customer classes unprofitable in
highly congested states. Unlike static pricing, the use of dynamic pricing enables the service
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provider to refuse entry to these classes, further improving profit.
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APPENDIX A
COMPLEMENTARY RESULTS FOR CHAPTER 3
Lemma A.0.1 The function ϕN (·) is nondecreasing on [0,∞).
Proof In what follows, all derivatives are with respect to ρ. For simplicity, we omit the











L′ = π′0F + F
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L′′ = π0F































































































































































n=max(0,k−N) n(k − n)(k − n − 1)(k − 2n). We will prove that ak is positive.
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2n,
we have ak ≥ 0. Thus, L
′′π′0 − L
′π′′0 ≤ 0 and ϕN
′ ≥ 0. 2
Lemma A.0.2 For N ≤ ∞, the function γbN (·) is nonincreasing on [0,∞).
Proof We prove that γbN (·) is nonincreasing for ρ ≥ 0 by showing that its derivative is
nonpositive. In what follows, all derivatives are with respect to ρ. For simplicity, we omit
the arguments of the functions. Recall that
γbN =
∑N−1
































Now let us take the derivative of γbN . Note that if N = ∞, we can still interchange derivative
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n(2n − k)Pn−1Pk−n−1. (23)
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n(2n − k)Pn−1Pk−n−1 = 0.
Furthermore, when n = 1,
n(2n − k)Pn−1Pk−n−1 = 1(2(1) − k)P0Pk−2 ≤ 0.














































n(n + 1)(n − 1)
3
Pn−1Pk−n−1. (27)
Since {ps} is nonincreasing, Pj−1Pn−j−1 ≥ Pn−1, for all j = (n − N) ∨ 1, . . . , N ∧ (n − 1).
Hence, inequality (26) holds.
To compare (23) and (27), it remains to show that for 2 ≤ n ≤ k − 1, n(n+1)(n−1)3 ≥
n(2n − k). Since 2 ≤ n ≤ k − 1, we have
n(2n − k) ≤ n(n − 1) ≤
n(n + 1)(n − 1)
3
.
Therefore, the right-hand side of (27) is greater than or equal to the right-hand side of (23)
implying that A ≤ B. Hence, γbN
′
(·) ≤ 0 and γbN (·) is nonincreasing 2


















µ+sθ for n = 0, . . . , N − 1 and Q−1 = 1. Note that γ
r
N (·) has the
same expression as γrN (·), where {Qn} is substituted for {Pn}. To show that γ
r
N (·) is
non increasing, we use Lemma A.0.2 after verifying that {Qn} and {Pn} have the same
properties. In Lemma A.0.2, we only use the fact that {Pn} and {ps} are nonincreasing
sequences. Similarly, {Qn} and {
µ
µ+sθ} are nonincreasing sequences. Therefore, γ
r
N (·) is
nonincreasing on [0,∞). 2
Lemma A.0.4 Consider an M/M/1/N queue with holding costs. Then, for all ρ ≥ 0,
1. γhN (ρ) ≥ π0(ρ, N),
2. 1 − πN (ρ, N) ≥ γ
h
N (ρ),
3. N − L(ρ, N) ≥ π0(ρ, N)ϕN (ρ),
4. ρϕN (ρ)(1 − πN (ρ, N)) ≥ L(ρ, N),
where



















if ρ 6= 1,
1
6N
2 + 12N +
1
















if ρ 6= 1,
1
2 if ρ(y) = 1.
Proof For clarity, we will omit the arguments of the quantities we use in this proof. For
instance, we will write π0 instead of π0(ρ, N). All derivatives in this proof are with respect
to ρ.
94




N = 1/2, which agrees







(1 − ρ)(1 − ρN )

















k=0 (1 − ρ









































s + (N − 1)ρN−1
≤ 1.
2. Let us prove now that 1−πN ≥ γ
h
N , which is easily verified when ρ = 1. Now suppose







(1 − ρN )2
1 + NρN+1 − (N + 1)ρN
− 1
=
1 − 2ρN + ρ2N − 1 − NρN+1 + (N + 1)ρN
1 + NρN+1 − (N + 1)ρN
=
ρN (ρN − Nρ + (N − 1))
1 + NρN+1 − (N + 1)ρN
.
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We know from Ziya [24] that
1 + NρN+1 − (N + 1)ρN ≥ 0 and
ρN − Nρ + (N − 1) = (ρN − 1) − N(ρ − 1)






Therefore, 1 − πN ≥ γ
h
N .
3. We need to show that N − L ≥ π0ϕN . When ρ = 1, we have N − L =
N
















n = π0F , where F =
∑N
n=0 nρ


























≤ N − L.
4. It remains to prove that ρϕN (1 − πN ) ≥ L. When ρ = 1, we have

















Now suppose ρ 6= 1. In the same fashion, ϕN = −F −
π0
π′0
F ′. Moreover, note that
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ρ(1 − πN ) = 1 − π0. So,
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2−min(N, k) ≤ n ≤ min(N, k)−
k







+ n)2n ≥ (
k
2


















+ n)2n ≥ 0.
Hence, we can claim that ρϕN (1 − πN ) ≥ L and the proof is complete.
2
Lemma A.0.5 Consider an M/M/1/N queue under static price y ≥ 0 in the model with
balking customers. Then, the following holds:
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Consider an M/M/1/N queue under static price y ≥ 0 in the model with impatient
customers. Then, the following holds:







Proof We will only prove the result for the model with balking customers. In the model
with impatient customers, the result is proved in the exact same fashion by substituting




















Therefore, γrN (ρ(y)) ≥ π0(ρ(y), N).


















































COMPLEMENTARY RESULTS FOR CHAPTER 4
Lemma B.0.6 Let I = 1. Then, for s = 0, . . . , N − 1, we have:













sup{z : (g∗N + hs − µsG(s − 1))r1(z) ≤ λ1(z)} if g
∗
N + hs > µsG(s − 1)
β1 otherwise
2. in systems with balking customers:
z∗1,s = sup{z : (g
∗
N − µsG(s − 1))r1(z) ≤ λ1(z)},
3. in systems with impatient customers:
z∗1,s = sup{z : (g
∗
N − (µs + (s − q)
+θ)G(s − 1))r1(z) ≤ wsλ1(z)}.
Proof First, we prove the result for systems with holding costs. Since we only have one
customer class, we omit the class subscript in the following. In Theorem 4.2.1, we proved
that z∗s = inf{z : r(z)(z − G(s)) ≥ 1}. Now suppose g
∗
N + hs > µsG(s − 1). Therefore,
z∗s < β. It is straightforward to show that sup{λ(z)(z−G(s))−g
∗
N −hs +µsG(s−1)} = 0 is
equivalent to sup{z−G(s)−
g∗N+hs−µsG(s−1)
λ(z) } = 0, where z
∗
s is the unique price that attains
the supremum. Let
ts(z) = z − G(s) −
g∗N + hs − µsG(s − 1)
λ(z)
,
t′s(z) = 1 − (g
∗
N + hs − µsG(s − 1))
r(z)
λ(z)
, a.e. on [α, β].
99
Under IGHR, Proposition 5.1 of Ziya [23] shows that t′s(·) is strictly decreasing almost
everywhere on (inf{z : zr(z) ≥ 1}, β), which includes (z∗s , β). Hence, t
′
s(·) < 0 almost
everywhere on (z∗s , β). Therefore,
z∗s = sup{z : t
′
s(z) ≥ 0} = sup{z : (g
∗
N + hs − µsG(s − 1))r(z) ≤ λ(z)}.
Suppose that g∗N +hs ≥ µsG(s−1). Since we always have g
∗
N +hs ≤ µsG(s−1), we can
claim that g∗N + hs = µsG(s − 1) and sup{(z − G(s))λ(z)} = 0. We have two possibilities:
z∗s = β or z
∗
s = G(s) < β. The latter is impossible since there must exist ǫ > 0 such that
G(s) + ǫ < β and ǫλ(G(s) + ǫ) > 0. Therefore, z∗s = β.
In systems with balking customers and systems with impatient customers, the proof
only requires minor modifications and is omitted. 2
Proof of Propositions 4.2.6 and 4.2.10:
We use the same method as in the proof of Proposition 4.2.2. We prove Proposition
4.2.6 first. It is clear that the optimal dynamic reward g∗N is nondecreasing in N . To show
that z∗i,s,2 ≤ z
∗
i,s,1, we will prove that G2(s) ≤ G1(s) for all s = 0, . . . , N − 1 in each case.

















sup{λi(z)(z − G1(s))} = 0. (29)
Equality (29) is impossible since it implies that z∗i,s,1 = z
∗
i,s,2 = βi for all i, which
contradicts Lemma 4.2.4. Inequality (28) implies that











sup{λi(z)(z − G1(s))} > µsG1(s − 1). (31)
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By induction , 0 = G2(−1) > G1(−1) = 0, which yields a contradiction. Therefore, for all





















sup{λi(z)(wsz − G1(s))} = 0 (33)
for (28) and (29) and
(µs + (s − q)












> (µs + (s − q)
+θ)G1(s − 1).
for (30) and (31). Note that in this case, equality (33) is made impossible by Lemma 4.2.5.
2
Lemma B.0.7 For all g > 0, Ψh(·, g) is a continuous nondecreasing contraction mapping
from R to (−∞, g+hN
µN
] and has a unique fixed point denoted by FP h(g). Moreover, FP h(·)
is increasing and continuous on [0,∞).
For all g > 0, Ψb(·, g) is a continuous nondecreasing contraction mapping from R to
(−∞, g
µN
] and has a unique fixed point denoted by FP b(g). Moreover, FP b(·) is increasing
and continuous on [0,∞).
Proof We will only prove the result for Ψh. The proof for Ψb is similar and is omitted. It is
clear that Ψh(V, g) is nondecreasing in V and continuity can be proven as Ψh(V, g) depends
on V through the supremum of a bounded continuous function of z.
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We will now prove that Ψh(·, g) is a contraction. Suppose that V1 ≤ V2. Then,
µN (Ψ


























(V2 − V1), which proves that Ψ
h(·, g) is a contraction mapping and has
a unique fixed point.
It remains to show that FP h(·) is increasing and continuous. Let 0 ≤ g1 < g2. There-
fore, Ψh(FP h(g2), g1) < Ψ(FP




FP h(·) is increasing. As Ψh(·, g) ≤ g+hN
µN
, we also have FP h(g) ≤ g+hN
µN
.
To prove that FP h(·) is continuous, we show by contradiction that it is both left-
continuous and right-continuous. Let gn ↑ g such that gn ≥ 0 for all n. Therefore,
FP h(gn) has a limit limn FP
h(gn) ≤ FP




h(gn) < Ψ(limn FP
h(gn), g). But limn FP
h(gn) ≥ FP
h(gm),∀m ≥ 0, so
limn FP
h(gn) > Ψ(limn FP
h(gn), gm). As m goes to infinity, we have limn FP
h(gn) ≥
Ψ(limn FP
h(gn), g), yielding a contradiction. Hence, FP
h(·) is left-continuous.
In the same fashion, let gn ↓ g, such that gn ≥ 0 for all n. Therefore FP
h(gn)
has a limit limn FP
h(gn) ≥ FP






h(gn), g). However, limn FP
h(gn) ≤ FP
h(gm),∀m ≥ 0, which
implies that limn FP
h(gn) < Ψ
h(limn FP




h(gn), g), yielding a contradiction. Therefore, FP
h(·) is
continuous on [0,∞). 2
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